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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the prospects for the emerging field of neuroeconomics to shed light on traditional
positive and normative economic questions. It argues that the potential for meaningful contributions,







The last few years have witnessed impressive progress toward understanding the neurobi-
ology of decision making (see, e.g., Rangel, 2008). This progress reﬂects the individual and
collaborative eﬀorts of scholars from a variety of intersecting disciplines. The pace of dis-
covery plainly establishes the viability of neuroeconomics as an independent, self-sustaining
ﬁeld, one that addresses a new set of fascinating and scientiﬁcally meritorious questions.
Many participants in this area of inquiry, as well as interested observers, hope neuroeco-
nomics will also eventually make foundational contributions to the various traditional ﬁelds
from which it emerged, including economics, psychology, and artiﬁcial intelligence. My
p u r p o s eh e r ei st oe v a l u a t ei t sp o t e n t i a lc o n t r i b u t i o n st oe c o n o m i c s .
Some would argue that any aspect of economic decision making is deﬁnitionally an aspect
of economics. According to that view, neuroeconomics necessarily contributes to economics
by expanding the set of empirical questions that economists can address. I will avoid such
semantic disputes. My exclusive interest here is in assessing whether, in time, neuroeco-
nomics is likely to shed useful light on traditional economic questions. I recognize of course
that the scope of traditional economics may eventually expand to include portions of neuroe-
conomics, even if neuroeconomics never addresses any economic question currently regarded
as standard. However, regardless of whether economists eventually broaden their interests,
it is still both legitimate and important to ask whether neuroeconomics can illuminate the
issues that economists have historically addressed. While the scope of traditional economics
is diﬃcult to deﬁne with precision, I am content with an operational deﬁnition, based on
the collection of substantive (as opposed to methodological) questions and issues currently
discussed in standard economic textbooks and leading professional journals.
The potential importance of neuroeconomics for economic inquiry has already been the
subject of much debate. For example, an optimistic assessment appeared in a paper ti-
tled “Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains,” by Colin Camerer, George Loewen-
stein, and Drazen Prelec [2004].1 Subsequently, Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer [2008]
1See also Glimcher and Rustichini [2004], Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec [2005], Rustichini [2005],
Glimcher, Dorris, and Bayer [2005], and Camerer [2007]2
penned a broad critique of neuroeconomics, titled “The Case for Mindless Economics,” which
expressed deep skepticism. My assessment lies between those extremes. I caution against
dismissing the entire ﬁeld merely because current technology is limited, or because some of
the early claims concerning its potential contributions to standard economics were excessive
and/or incompletely articulated. However, because I share many of the conceptual concerns
raised by Gul and Pesendorfer, I also see a pressing need for a critical and systematic artic-
ulation of the ﬁeld’s relevance for traditional economics. Such an articulation would ideally
identify standard economic questions of broad interest (e.g., how taxes aﬀect saving), and
outline conceivable research agendas based on actual or potential technologies that could
lead to speciﬁc, useful insights of direct relevance to those questions. Vague assertions that
a deeper understanding of decision-making processes will lead to better models of choice will
not suﬃce to convince the skeptics.
This paper represents my attempt to identify and articulate the speciﬁcw a y si nw h i c h
neuroeconomics might contribute to mainstream economics, as well as the limitations of
those potential contributions. It sets forth both my reservations and my reasons for guarded
optimism. As will be evident, my evaluation is based in large part on the contemplation of
research agendas that may or may not become technologically or practically feasible. My
contention is only that there are conceivable paths to relevant and signiﬁcant achievements,
not that success is guaranteed. At this early stage in the evolution of neuroeconomics,
the speculative visualization of such achievements is critical, both because it justiﬁes the
continuing interest and open-mindedness of mainstream economists, and because it helps
neuroeconomists hone research agendas that would be more useful and relevant to those
who examine traditional economic questions.
The paper is organized as follows. I discuss potential contributions to the positive
analysis of decision making in Section 1, potential contributions to normative economics in
Section 2, and draw overall conclusions in Section 3.3
1 Positive economic analysis of decision making
While neuroeconomists are convinced that a better understanding of how decisions are made
will lead to better predictions concerning which alternatives are chosen, many traditional
economists greet that proposition with skepticism. In this section, I discuss the basis for
their skepticism, and then attempt to identify speciﬁc ways in which neuroeconomics could
in principle contribute to traditional positive economic analysis of decision making.
1.1 A framework for discussion
Advocates and critics of neuroeconomics (as it pertains to standard economics) often appear
to speak at cross-purposes, using similar language to discuss divergent matters, thereby
rendering many exchanges largely unresponsive on both sides. In the earnest hope of
avoiding such diﬃculties, I will ﬁrst provide a framework for my discussion, so that I can
articulate and address particular issues with precision.
Suppose our objective is to determine the manner in which an individual’s choice of a
vector y is causally inﬂuenced by a set of conditions, x, which the individual regards as ﬁxed
(or at least predetermined).2 For example, y m i g h tb eav e c t o ro ft h eq u a n t i t i e so fv a r i o u s
goods the individual purchases, and x might include prices and sales tax rates, as well as the
individual’s age, gender, and income. It is worth emphasizing that we are concerned here
with the type of relationship that describes the behavior of a single individual, rather than
a collection of interacting individuals; thus, this framework is not intended to encompass
economic models that describe equilibria in markets or games. It does, however, subsume
models that depict the choices of a single individual within such contexts, and which typically
serve as the building blocks for equilibrium analysis.
For the time being, we will take x to include only the types of variables normally consid-
ered by economists. We recognize nevertheless that y depends not only on x, but also on
2Sometimes, the objective of traditional positive economics is simply to forecast y given a set of observed
conditions x, without interpreting the forecasting relation as causal. In some contexts, it may be helpful to
condition such forecasts on neuroeconomic variables; see the discussion in Sections 1.4 and 1.5, below.4
a set of unobservable conditions, ω, which may include the types of conditions studied by
psychologists and neuroeconomists, such as psychological or neural traits, as well as other
factors. We hypothesize that the causal relationship between y and the conditions, (x,ω),
is governed by some function f:
y = f(x,ω) (1)
The function f could be either a simple reduced form (e.g., a collection of demand
functions, each expressing purchases of a good as a function of its own price, the prices of
other goods, and income), or a more elaborate structural economic model. For instance,
it could indicate that the individual’s choices maximize some objective function given the
available alternatives when the conditions x and ω prevail.3 It is important to emphasize
that standard economic models of decision making, whether reduced form or structural,
are typically agnostic with respect to the nature of decision processes.I n p a r t i c u l a r , n o
explicit assumptions are usually made concerning the inner workings of the brain. For
example, we often assume that individuals act as if they maximize utility, not that their
brains necessarily assign actual utility values to alternatives and identify the alternative with
the highest assigned value. That is why economists commonly take the position that the
reduced form for a structural model of decision-making embodies all of the model’s empirical
implications. (I will return to that issue in Section 1.5.1.) There are notable exceptions;
for example, models of cognition and reasoning in strategic environments have empirical
implications concerning processes (see, e.g., Costa-Gomez and Crawford, 2006). However,
as process-oriented models of decision-making are still relatively uncommon in economics, I
will set them aside until Section 1.5.2.
Economists typically treat the unobserved conditions, ω, as noise and attempt to de-
termine the causal eﬀects of the observed environmental conditions, x, on the distribution
3In the latter case, an economist would typically interpret the free parameters of the objective function as
aspects of preferences. However, in modern choice theory, one can view preferences and utility functions as
mere constructs that economists invent to summarize systematic behavioral patterns. From that perspective,
we are of course concerned with the accurate estimation of preference parameters, but only because they
imply the behavioral relation f.5
of decisions, y. If the distribution of ω is governed by a probability measure μ, then the
distribution of y will correspond to a probability measure η(·|x), where for any Borel set
A, η(A | x)=μ({ω | f(x,ω) ∈ A}). For example, the standard linear model assumes that
f(x,ω)=xβ + ε(ω),
where ε is an unspeciﬁed function. It follows that η(A | x)=μ({ω | xβ + ε(ω) ∈ A}).
Generally, economists attempt to estimate η directly from data on observable conditions,
x, and decisions, y. In the case of the linear model, they estimate the parameter vector β
along with parameters governing the distribution of ε. There is no opportunity to recover
the form of the function ε(·) or the distribution of ω. Nor is there an obvious need. For
example, when studying the behavioral eﬀect of a sales tax on consumption, a traditional
economist would not be concerned with quantifying the variation in behavior attributable to
speciﬁc neural traits; rather, she would focus on either the average response (by estimating
a linear model in which the tax rate appears without interactions), a characteristic-speciﬁc
response (by including interactions between the tax rate and other elements of x,s u c h
as gender), or the distribution of responses (by allowing for interactions between the tax
rate and unobservables, as in a random coeﬃcients model), without conditioning on neural
characteristics. Accordingly, the identiﬁcation of the causal relation η(A | x),w h e r ex
consists of standard economic variables such as prices, taxes, incomes, age, and gender, is
arguably our primary objective when we undertake traditional positive economic analysis of
decision making. (Whether it should remain so in light of developments in neuroeconomics
is plainly another matter; I will return to that issue shortly.)
In contrast, the objective of positive neuroeconomics is, in eﬀect, to get inside the function
f by studying brain processes. To illustrate, suppose that neural activity, z (a vector),
depends on observed and unobserved environmental conditions, through some function Z:
z = Z(x,ω)6
Choices result from the interplay between cognitive activity the environmental conditions:4
y = Y (z,x,ω)
It follows that
f(x,ω)=Y (Z(x,ω),x,ω)
Positive neuroeconomics attempts to uncover the structure of the function Z (the process
that determines of neural activity) and Y (the neural process that determines decisions).
From the perspective of a neuroeconomist, any standard economic model of decision making,
along with its associated function f, is a reduced form for the underlying neural processes.
Neuroeconomic research can also potentially shed light on the distribution of previously
unobserved neural components of ω, which is another building block of the relation η,t h e
object of primary interest to a traditional positive economist who studies decision making.
The tasks of traditional positive economics and positive neuroeconomics are therefore
plainly related. The question at hand is whether their interrelationships provide traditional
positive economists with useful and signiﬁcant opportunities to learn from neuroeconomics.
1.2 Is the relevance of neuroeconomics self-evident?
Most members of the neuroeconomics community believe that the relevance of their ﬁeld
to the economic analysis of decision making is practically self-evident; consequently, they
are puzzled by the persistent skepticism among many mainstream economists. To moti-
vate their agenda, they sometimes draw analogies to other subﬁelds that have successfully
opened “black boxes.” For example, Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec [2004] write (see also
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005, and Camerer, 2007):
“Traditional models treated the ﬁrm as a black box which produces output
based on inputs of capital and labor and a production function. This simpliﬁ-
cation is useful but modern views open the black box and study the contracting
4The arguments of Y include x and ω in addition to z because the same neural activity could lead to
diﬀerent outcomes depending on the environmental conditions.7
practices inside the ﬁrm–viz., how capital owners hire and control labor. Like-
wise, neuroeconomics could model the details of what goes on inside the con-
sumer mind just as organizational economics models what goes on inside ﬁrms.”
(Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2004, p. 556)
From the perspective of a mainstream economist, analogies between neuroeconomics and
the theory of the ﬁrm are misleading. In developing the theory of the ﬁrm, economists
were not motivated by the desire to improve the measurement of reduced form production
functions relating output to labor and capital. Rather, questions pertaining to the internal
workings of the ﬁrm (unlike those pertaining to the internal workings of the mind) fall
squarely within the historical boundaries of mainstream economics, because they concern
organized exchange between individuals. The literature on the theory of the ﬁrm reﬂects a
recognition that such exchange takes place not only within markets, but also within other
types of institutions, including ﬁrms. It embraces the premise that resource allocation
depends on the nature and scope of each exchange-facilitating institution. An economist
who seeks to understand prices, wages, risk sharing, and other traditional aspects of resource
allocation has an undeniable stake in understanding how trade plays out within a range
of institutions, including markets and ﬁrms, and how diﬀerent types of exchange come to
be governed by diﬀerent types of institution. In contrast, the mind is not an economic
institution, and exchange between individuals does not take place within it.5
Notably, economists have not materially beneﬁted from a long-standing ability to open
certain black boxes. We could have spent the last hundred years developing highly nuanced
theories of production processes through the study of physics and engineering, but did not.
Opening other black boxes has yielded disappointing results. For example, past eﬀorts
to understand price formation processes in competitive markets were largely unsatisfactory.
Relatively few economists are now interested in that topic; most are content to leave that
5A mainstream economist might also take a prescriptive interest in the organization of ﬁrms: economic
analysis can help to diagnose and ﬁx a company that allocates resources ineﬃciently. In contrast, the diagno-
sis and treatment of poorly performing brains is traditionally the province of psychologists and psychiatrists,
not economists.8
box closed and focus on equilibria. A skeptical mainstream economist might also note that
models of neural processes are also black boxes. Indeed, the black box analogy is itself false:
we are dealing not with a single black box, but rather with a Russian doll. Do we truly
believe that good economics requires mastery of string theory?
My frequent coauthor, Antonio Rangel, a pioneer in neuroeconomics, has defended the
ﬁeld’s relevance to economics by arguing that the goal of all science is to explain “why.”
Yet every scientiﬁc explanation begs that question because it proceeds from assumptions
for which no explanation is oﬀered. Newton’s theory of gravity explains why apples fall
from trees, but it does not explain why objects produce gravitational ﬁelds. If one’s limited
objective is to predict the point in time at which the apple will strike the ground, one does
not require (and may not even beneﬁt from) an answer to the latter question, despite its
obvious scientiﬁci m p o r t a n c e .
In giving voice to these responses, I do not in any way wish to suggest that we should
let all black boxes (or Russian dolls) remain closed. After all, the ﬁeld of macroeconomics
has progressed through the systematic exploration of microfoundations. Nevertheless, it is
understandable that so many economists are unmoved by the amorphous possibility that
delving into the nuts and bolts of decision-making will lead to better and more useful eco-
nomic theories. To persuade them that a particular black box merits opening, one must
at least provide a speculative roadmap, outlining reasonably speciﬁc potentialities which
economists would recognize as directly relevant. What has been oﬀered along these lines to
date is too vague and insubstantial to convert the skeptics.
1.3 Some speciﬁcs o u r c e so fs k e p t i c i s m
Some neuroeconomists have attempted to oﬀer economists a variety of aﬃrmative motiva-
tions for opening the black box of the human mind.6 Many mainstream economists ﬁnd those
motivations unpersuasive because they see neuroeconomic inquiry as largely orthogonal to
6See, e.g., Glimcher and Rustichini [2004], Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec [2004, 2005], Rustichini
[2005], Glimcher, Dorris, and Bayer [2005], and Camerer [2007]9
traditional economic analysis, a view that ﬁnds its most forceful articulation in the work of
Gul and Pesendorfer [2008]. To identify motivations that economists would generally ﬁnd
persuasive, one must directly confront the logic of that view.
For the rest of this subsection, let us accept the premise that the primary historical
objective of positive economics (as it pertains to individual decision making) is to recover
causal behavioral relationships of the form η(·|x),w h e r ey describes conventional economic
decisions and x is a vector of standard economic variables, such as prices, tax rates, gender,
age, income, etc. (I will reexamine that premise shortly.) Much of the prevailing skepticism
concerning the magnitude of the contribution that neuroeconomics can potentially make to
standard positive economics arises from the following three considerations.
First, though the functions Y and Z are obviously interesting, the questions they address
directly are not ones that mainstream economists traditionally examine.
Second, because we have assumed (for the purposes of the discussion in this subsection)
that the behavioral relation η contains only conventional economic variables, a traditional
economist could in principle divine all of its properties from standard economic data. Dis-
tinguishing between two neural processes, (Y,Z,μ) and (Y 0,Z0,μ0), advances the limited
objective speciﬁed above only if the diﬀerences between those processes lead to signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the corresponding reduced form representations, η and η0.B u t i f t h e
latter diﬀerences are indeed signiﬁcant, then an economist might reasonably hope to test be-
tween η and η0 directly using conventional economic data, without relying on neuroeconomic
methods.
Third, while neuroeconomics potentially oﬀers another route to uncovering the structure
of the relation η, there is skepticism concerning the likelihood that it will actually improve
upon traditional methods. The prospects for building up a complete model of complex eco-
nomic decisions from neural foundations would appear remote at this time. Even if such
a model were assembled, it might not be especially useful. Precise algorithmic models of
decision making of the sort to which many neuroeconomists aspire would presumably map10
highly detailed descriptions of environmental and neurobiological conditions into choices.
In constructing the distribution η from Y , Z,a n dμ, a microeconomist would treat vast
amounts of this “micro-micro” information as noise. An economist might reasonably hope
to apprehend the structure of η more readily by studying the relationship between y and
x directly, particularly if the explanatory variables of interest (x) include a relatively small
number of standard environmental conditions. As an example, suppose η is the household
demand function for a good. What does a standard economist lose by subsuming all of
the idiosyncratic, micro-micro factors that inﬂuence decisions, many of which change from
moment to moment, within a statistical disturbance term? What can neuroeconomics teach
us about the relationship between average purchases and the standard economic variables of
interest (prices, income, and advertising) that we cannot discern by studying those relation-
ships directly?
These considerations do not, however, rule out the possibility that neuroeconomics might
make signiﬁcant contributions to mainstream economics. With respect to the second con-
sideration, even the most skeptical economist must acknowledge that the standard data
required to address questions of interest are sometimes unavailable, and are rarely generated
under ideal conditions. Surely we should explore the possibility that new types of data
and methods of analysis might help us overcome those limitations. With respect to the
third consideration, even an imperfect understanding of neural processes may oﬀer viable
strategies for improving our ability to recover behavioral relations involving standard eco-
nomic variables; I will describe speciﬁc possibilities in the ensuing subsections. Finally, the
scope of mainstream economics (as it relates to individual decision making) is not strictly
conﬁned to the limited objective stated at the outset of this discussion. It is worth consid-
ering the possibility that neuroeconomics will allow us to accomplish other objectives and
answer new questions that mainstream economists would recognize as falling within their
ﬁeld’s boundaries.
The remainder of this section examines a number of routes through which neuroeco-11
nomics could potentially contribute to standard positive economics. First, neuroeconomics
will lead to the measurement of new variables, some of which may usefully ﬁnd their way into
otherwise conventional economic analyses. I discuss that possibility in Section 1.4. Second,
detailed knowledge concerning the neural processes of decision making may help economists
discriminate between theories and/or choose between models. As discussed in Section 1.5,
the formulation of rigorous tests may prove challenging. With some notable exceptions,
standard economic theories of decision making concern choice patterns, and are therefore
agnostic with respect to decision processes; hence, they may have few testable neural impli-
cations. Sections 1.6 and 1.7 examine the more modest possibility that an understanding
of neural processes may provide economists with informal but nevertheless useful guidance
with respect to model selection.
While I see the potential for neuroeconomics to enrich standard positive economics, I
nevertheless doubt that it will revolutionize the practice of our discipline within its tra-
ditional scope. As I see it, the paths that hold the greatest promise for success involve
the augmentation rather than the replacement of existing economic methods. For exam-
ple, neural variables may well ﬁnd their way into otherwise standard econometric analysis.
That development would not necessarily require an extensive knowledge of neuroeconomic
methods or a deep appreciation of neural processes; instead, an economist might simply
rely on neuroscientists to identify and collect the relevant data. Similarly, even if ﬁndings
from neuroscience informally guide aspects of model selection (variables and/or functional
forms), once a traditional positive economist knows the structure of the selected model, she
can discard all information concerning neural processes without loss. Consider an example.
Neuroeconomics can perhaps illuminate the relationships between marketing and attention,
and between attention and purchases. From that information, we might be able to learn
something useful about the relationship between marketing and purchases. But once we have
identiﬁed the implied restrictions on the latter relationship, a positive economist arguably
gains nothing of value from knowledge of its neural underpinnings.7
7The manner in which marketing inﬂuences attention is, however, potentially of interest to a normative12
1.4 Are there potential uses for neuroeconomic variables?
Neural variables play two distinct roles in the framework of Section 1.1. Some specify
exogenous (or at least preexisting) neural conditions under which a decision is made, and
appear as elements of ω. Others describe endogenous neural reactions to the presentation
of a decision problem, and appear as elements of z. Exogenous neuroeconomic variables
include neural traits that remain ﬁxed throughout a time window that encompasses the
contemplation and execution of a particular decision problem. Such traits could reﬂect
genetics and/or the eﬀects of environmental factors. One existing method of assessing
neural traits involves the measurement of activity in the resting brain (see, e.g., Gianotti et
al., 2008). Other methods might include the identiﬁcation of genetic markers that inﬂuence
neural architecture, or the measurement of subtle variations in brain structure.8 In contrast,
endogenous neuroeconomic variables typically measure aspects of neural activity during the
process of decision making. The use of variables from these two classes raise diﬀerent issues,
and I will discuss them in separate subsections.
1.4.1 Exogenous neuroeconomic variables
The discussion in Section 1.3 takes η(·|x),w i t hx deﬁned to include only traditional
economic variables, as the object of interest for traditional positive economic analyses of
decision making. It therefore ignores the possibility that neuroeconomics might redraw the
boundary between the set of variables that economists treat as observable (x), and those
they treat as unobservable (ω). More formally, by measuring some vector of variables e ω,
a neuroeconomist can repartition the environmental conditions (x,ω) into (x0,ω0),w h e r e
x0 =( x, e ω) and ω =( ω0, e ω), and potentially allow economists to recover the causal relation
η0(·|x0).
economist. For example, in situations where choice evidence is inconsistent, information concerning attention
may reveal whether a particular choice reﬂects a full understanding of the true opportunity set. I discuss
such possibilities, and the implied normative role for neuroeconomics, in Section 2.2.1.
8Traditionally, neuroscientists have relied on gross variations in brain structure, such as brain lesions
resulting from accidents; see, e.g., Damasio and Damasio [1989].13
It is important to acknowledge at the outset of this discussion that the barriers to re-
drawing the boundary between observable and unobservable variables may be practical and
political, not merely technological. Participants in large-scale surveys may well decline to
cooperate with neural or genetic “ﬁngerprinting.” Even if such information were collected,
privacy concerns might preclude its release to the research community. After all, many
existing data sets omit variables that are innocuous by comparison to genetics, such as the
state or zip code of an individual’s residence. Still, social attitudes toward privacy issues
are changing (as exempliﬁed by postings of personal information on the web), and there are
various ways to protect the conﬁdentiality of survey participants, for example by placing
conditions and restrictions on the data’s usage. For the purpose of this discussion, let us
suspend disbelief and consider the possibilities.
Why might the distribution η0(·|x0), which subsumes the behavioral eﬀects of neural
variables, as well as the eﬀects of standard environmental factors conditional on neural vari-
ables, be of interest to mainstream economists? The answer is not obvious. Suppose a neu-
roeconomist discovers a neural trait that helps predict saving (a “patience marker”). Should
mainstream economists greet that discovery with enthusiasm? Economics has not, after all,
concerned itself historically with the relationship between neural attributes and saving. An
economist might question whether that knowledge is likely to improve his understanding of
the eﬀects of, say, capital income taxes (an element of x) on asset accumulation. Knowing
that a tax policy has diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent demographic groups is potentially of inter-
est, as is the measurement of the degree to which those eﬀects vary within each demographic
group; in both cases, the hypothesized ﬁnding sheds light on traditional questions about
incidence and eﬃciency. In contrast, knowing that the within-group variance in the policy’s
eﬀect is linked to a speciﬁc neural trait does not illuminate a traditional economic question.
In principle, one could compute incidence and eﬃciency eﬀects across neurally diﬀerentiated
groups, but to what end? (One can come up with reasons for making such a calculation —
I mention one speculative possibility below — but I have not yet encountered a reason that14
I ﬁnd compelling.)
There are certainly contexts in which the information contained in η(·|x) completely
answers a traditional economic question. However, in other contexts, η0(·|x0) also contains
pertinent information. In addition, even if η(·|x) is the object of interest, the use of
neural variables may facilitate its accurate measurement (implicitly or explicitly through the
estimation of η0(·|x0)). The following is a list of contexts in which neural variables may
prove useful.
Detecting and mitigating bias associated with poorly measured or omitted variables. Econo-
mists often worry that the explanatory variables in behavioral regressions may be correlated
with unobserved aspects of preferences or talent that in turn inﬂuence behavior. Neuroe-
conomists hope to identify exogenous neural traits that are associated with speciﬁcp r e -
dispositions and abilities. If such data were available (admittedly a very tall order, both
practically and politically), economists could use it to create neural proxies for tastes and
talents. The use of such variables would fall squarely within the scope of conventional
economics; mainstream economists seek and use proxies for hard-to-measure conditions as a
matter of course. A signiﬁcant partial correlation between an explanatory variable and a
behaviorally pertinent neural proxy would point to an omitted variables problem, which the
inclusion of such proxies would presumably mitigate.
Sometimes, correlations between explanatory variables and pertinent unobserved char-
acteristics arise from selection eﬀects. Consider, for example, the literature concerning the
eﬀects of 401(k) retirement saving plans on asset accumulation. It is widely recognized
that those who are predisposed to save may sort themselves into jobs with 401(k) plans or
press their employers to create such plans (see, e.g., the discussion in Bernheim, 2002). If
that predisposition is omitted from a regression of saving on 401(k) eligibility (and other
variables), the coeﬃcient of the eligibility variable may exaggerate its causal eﬀect. Armed
with data on a “patience marker,” we could determine whether an individual’s underlying
propensity to save predicts eligibility for a 401(k) plan, conditional on other characteristics,15
and thereby assess both the presence and potential severity of self-selection. The addition
of suﬃciently powerful neural taste proxies to the regression would presumably mitigate the
resulting bias.
Curing endogeneity. In many economic settings, the decisions of distinct individuals are
codetermined. To identify the causal eﬀect of one individual’s choice on another’s decision,
we require an instrument — speciﬁcally, a variable that directly aﬀects the decision of one
and only one individual. Neural predispositions arguably have that property. Consider,
for example, the problem of estimating the size of peer eﬀects in the context of charitable
giving (e.g., Andreoni and Scholz, 1998, Carman, 2003). The eﬀect of one person’s giving
on another’s gift is diﬃcult to measure both because of selection eﬀects (people may sort
themselves into peer groups based on common characteristics related to giving), and because
peers are mutually inﬂuenced by each others’ gifts. The discovery and measurement of
an “altruism marker” could allow us to detect the presence of peer eﬀects by studying
the relationship between an individual’s giving and the neural charitable predispositions
of his peers, controlling for his own predisposition.9 From that reduced form behavioral
relationship, we could recover a structural economic model relating each individual’s gift to
the giving of his peers. Equivalently, we could treat the endogeneity problem arising from
selection and codetermination by using each peer’s genetic charitable predisposition as an
instrument for his or her gift.
Forecasting behavior as of a particular moment in time. Sometimes an economist is
narrowly concerned with the accuracy of a behavioral forecast at a particular moment in
time. If a neural condition is known to correlate with behavior, then a forecaster ought to
use any available information concerning that condition. Consider the following example,
which was suggested to me by Antonio Rangel. Suppose an equity investor’s neural state
at the start of a day (a predetermined variable) predicts the nature of his trading strategy
(e.g., caution versus aggression) over the course of the day better than conventional variables.
9Such a discovery could also help us detect and evaluate selection eﬀects by directly measuring the extent
to which people sort themselves into groups based on their neural charitable predisposition.16
Then by collecting neural measurements for a sample of traders, one might be able to forecast
short-term movements of the stock market. A skeptic might object that an idiosyncratic
shock to a single investor’s neural state would have no eﬀect on the market, and any market-
wide shock to investors’ neural states presumably has some observable cause (such as a news
report), which can then serve equally well as a predictor. But the relationship between
observable events and neural reactions may be complex and diﬃcult to model. For example,
a given event may cause diﬀerent levels of anxiety depending on its presentation (which is
subjective) and prevailing expectations (which are tricky to measure). A forecaster armed
with neural measurements might therefore perform better than one who closely monitors the
news.
Extrapolating behavioral responses from one population to another. Sometimes, econo-
mists observe the eﬀects of a policy intervention for one population (for example, partici-
pants in a pilot study), and must extrapolate its eﬀects for a second population (for example,
residents of a state). Suppose responses diﬀer from individual to individual according to
observable characteristics (for example, age, gender, or ethnicity), and that the compositions
of the two populations diﬀer with respect to those characteristics. In that case, one can
compensate for the compositional diﬀerences in two steps: (i) measure the responses in the
ﬁrst population conditional on the observable characteristics; (ii) aggregate based on the
composition of the second population. Certain observable characteristics, such as gender
and race, are of course simply aspects of genetics. To improve the accuracy of the overall
forecast for the second population, one could add other pertinent biological traits (as iden-
tiﬁed by neuroeconomists) to the list of observable characteristics upon which the analysis
is conditioned.
Assessing the likely sensitivity of behavior to policy interventions. An appreciation of the
role of neural traits in decision making may lead to useful insights concerning the likely sensi-
tivity of behavior to environmental conditions. Consider, for example, the intergenerational
transmission of wealth. The discovery and analysis of a “patience marker” could shed light17
on the extent to which correlations between the wealth of parents and children reﬂect ge-
netic predispositions rather than environmental factors that are presumably more amenable
to policy interventions. One could in principle measure the eﬀect of such a trait on asset
accumulation by comparing the behavior of siblings with and without the trait (controlling,
of course, for other pertinent factors such as birth order and gender). In combination with
an estimate of the likelihood that a parent will pass the trait on to any given child, that
information would permit one to infer the importance of a purely genetic (and hence ﬁxed)
component of intergenerational wealth transmission.
Keeping up with the real world. Neuroeconomic methods may have commercial appli-
cations in the private sector. Some neuroeconomists project a near-term future in which
employers subject job applicants to tests that evaluate genetic and/or neural predisposi-
tions, and shoppers routinely encounter remote eye scans that allow advertisers to project
highly tailored promotional messages (as in the science ﬁction ﬁlm Minority Report,T w e n -
tieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 2002). To describe and analyze resource allocation in
light of such developments, economists would need to consider the behavioral roles of the
pertinent neural variables.
In principle, governments could also make use of information on citizens’ neural charac-
teristics. Indeed, conventional economics oﬀers potential justiﬁcations for that practice. For
example, if the eﬀects of a tax vary systematically with some neural trait within demographic
groups (a possibility mentioned above), then the unrestricted solution to a standard optimal
tax problem will involve trait-speciﬁc tax rates. Should the government contemplate such
policies, it will behoove economists to study behavioral relationships involving neural traits.
In practice, ethical and political concerns will likely preclude any serious consideration
of policies that discriminate based on neural characteristics, just as they currently preclude
diﬀerential treatment based on gender and ethnicity. Concerns over privacy, due process,
and discrimination might also lead to limitations on the use of neural and/or genetic data by
private ﬁrms. Such restrictions would obviously impact resource allocation. To understand18
and evaluate that impact, economists would need to understand the potential roles of neural
measurement in the private and public sectors.
1.4.2 Endogenous neuroeconomic variables
As I explained in Section 1.1, one of the main objectives of neuroeconomics is to uncover
the structure of the function Y , which maps endogenous neural activity, z,a l o n gw i t ht h e
environmental conditions x and ω, to decisions. Existing ﬁndings concerning Y suggest
that it may be possible to predict certain choices from particular types of endogenous neural
activity. For example, activity in the nucleus accumbens, the insula, and/or the mesial
prefrontal cortex correlates with purchase decisions (Knutson, 2007) and risk-taking (Kuhnen
and Knutson, 2005), while right orbital frontal cortex activation in response to ambiguity
correlates with ambiguity aversion (Hsu et al., 2005). Because accurate behavioral prediction
is a central goal of positive economics, many neuroeconomists have oﬀered such ﬁndings as
evidence of their ﬁeld’s relevance (see, e.g., Camerer, 2007).
Why are mainstream economists unpersuaded by this evidence? In the context of most
traditional economic questions, they see little value in predicting behavior based on its
endogenous components (here, z). Consider the following stark example. Suppose our goal
is to predict which grocery store customers will purchase milk. After carefully studying a
large sample of customers, a confused graduate student declares success, noting that it is
possible to predict milk purchases accurately with a single variable: whether the customer
reaches out to grab a carton of milk. The technology to collect this highly predictive data
has long been available; economists have demured not due to a lack of creativity, boldness,
and vision, but rather because such predictions are of no value to them.
By discussing the preceding example, I do not mean to trivialize neuroeconomic studies
that establish correlations between endogenous brain activity and choices. Findings that
help us understand the neurobiology of cognition and decision-making have unquestioned
scientiﬁc merit. I am concerned here only with a narrow issue: whether those ﬁndings
illuminate traditional economic questions. For all its scientiﬁc merit, the ability to predict19
choices from endogenous brain activity is largely orthogonal to the current objectives of
mainstream economists.
It is useful to restate this point using the formal notation introduced in Section 1.1.
The historical objective of positive economists is to improve the prediction of choice (y)
from standard exogenous variables (x), such as prices, taxes, income, gender, age, and so
forth. The observation that one can more accurately predict choice from endogenous neural
variables (z)s i m p l yd o e sn o ts p e a kt ot h a to b j e c t i v e .
Mainstream economists should not, however, completely dismiss the possibility that en-
dogenous neural variables will prove useful. In some situations, information concerning some
aspect of the environmental conditions, x, or the decision, y,m a yn o tb ea v a i l a b l e . D a t ao n
neural activity (z) along with knowledge of the functions Y and Z c a nt h e np o t e n t i a l l yp e r -
mit us to impute the missing conventional variables, and use the imputed values in otherwise
standard economic analyses.
Imputations of choices. The estimation of choice mappings (e.g., demand curves) unde-
niably falls within the province of mainstream economics. However, our traditional reliance
on naturally occurring choice data presents at least two problems, one practical and one
conceptual.
First, empirical economists are often constrained by the quality and availability of choice
data. One common problem is that such data are not generally available for samples in which
environmental conditions are randomly assigned. Consequently, causal interpretations of
estimated behavioral relationships are often controversial. In other contexts, such as when
a ﬁrm introduces a new product, choice data are simply unavailable.
Second, even in the most favorable circumstances, we can only observe a single choice for
a given individual at a particular moment in time; we never observe an individual’s choice
mapping. The estimation of a behavioral relationship thus requires the analyst to maintain
additional hypotheses. Typically, we assume that the relationship manifests some degree of
stability across distinct moments in time and/or potentially diverse individuals. However,20
except in special cases, those assumptions are untestable, and without them not even the
distribution of choice mappings — let alone the choice mapping that an individual would
follow at a moment in time — is identiﬁed.10
To some extent, one can address these problems by conducting appropriate choice experi-
ments. In principle, one can design an experiment with random assignment of environmental
conditions to collect data on any feasible choice. In addition, the strategy method arguably
permits the elicitation of an individual’s choice mapping at a moment in time, rather than
a single choice. However, choice experiments raise new diﬃculties. The experimental
replication of signiﬁcant real-world decisions can be prohibitively costly. In addition, the
legitimacy of the strategy method depends on implicit assumptions, and evidence concerning
its validity is mixed (see, e.g., Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van-de-Kuilen, 2004).
Were it possible to gather accurate data by posing hypothetical choices, one could easily
and inexpensively identify any individual’s choice mapping within any set of potential al-
ternatives, without invoking additional assumptions or raising concerns about non-random
environmental conditions. Indeed, marketing specialists often attempt to estimate demand
curves for new products based on answers to hypothetical questions. Unfortunately, such
data are known to be inaccurate within many domains, and economists are therefore rightly
suspicious of their use.
Neuroeconomic methods can potentially address all of the limitations discussed above
by, in eﬀect, allowing us to treat rich collections of decision problems hypothetically, while
nevertheless imputing predictively accurate choices. Speciﬁcally, it is natural to hypothesize
that an individual’s choice among a set of alternatives bears a stable relation to the neural
responses they generate as she considers them. If that hypothesis proves correct, appropriate
neural measurements may permit us to predict with accuracy which alternative she would
choose even when no choice is oﬀered at the time of measurement.11 Jezewski et al. [2009]
investigate that possibility. Their ﬁndings suggest that it may indeed possible to recover
10These assertions are based on work in progress, which I am conducting with Debraj Ray.
11One can validate such predictions by oﬀering choices unexpectedly.21
the complete choice mapping that an individual would follow at a moment in time, at least
for relatively small sets of potential alternatives.12 From such information, one could, for
example, construct the demand curve of a particular individual at a speciﬁc moment, without
relying on potentially objectionable assumptions (aside from predictive accuracy, which is
testable) or raising concerns about non-random assignment.
Neuroeconomic methods are of course far less convenient and more costly than batteries
of hypothetical questions. Even so, it is likely that technological progress will reduce costs
and improve convenience considerably. Such methods could therefore provide a rich source
of imputed choice data, which in principle could augment or substitute for actual choices
in otherwise standard economic analysis, leading to more accurate behavioral estimates and
more powerful tests of consumer theory.
Presumably, neuroeconomic research will also identify limits on the reliability of neurally
imputed choices. For example, predictions may become less accurate when an individual
is presented with a large number of prospects. Under some conditions, neural responses
may track hypothetical decisions more accurately than actual decisions. Imputations may
prove less reliable when the choice is unfamiliar (e.g., the purchase of a new product), and/or
sensitive to presentation when the alternatives are complex. All of those possibilities bear
careful investigation.
Imputations of unobserved environmental conditions. Private information plays a central
role in large segments of modern economic theory. However, in many if not most cases,
economists are no better positioned to observe private information than anyone else. For
example, in the context of insurance markets, we are often limited to some subset of the
data available to insurance companies, which are typically unable to monitor policyholders’
activities or elicit important private information.
Provided the collection of pertinent neural data is feasible, neuroeconomists could con-
12Speciﬁcally, the study shows that neural responses to the presentation of various prospects accurately
predict the subsequent choices that subjects make from any subset of those prospects, even when subjects do
not anticipate that they will confront a choice. The experiment is limited to small sets of relatively simple
items, and the generality of the result is not yet known.22
ceivably draw reliable inferences about private information without observing it directly.
The technical feasibility of that agenda has already been established. Speciﬁcally, Wang et
al. (2006) conducted an experimental study of a “biased transmission game” involving cheap
talk, in which one party (the “sender”) observes a state of the world and transmits a message
to another party (the “receiver”) who then makes a decision. Payoﬀs are structured so that
the sender wishes to mislead the receiver as to the true state. Statistical analysis reveals
that it is possible to make meaningful inferences about the sender’s private information by
observing his pupil dilation (which tends to reﬂect arousal and/or stress).
In addition to facilitating improved tests of economic theories in which private information
plays a role, such techniques may also have practical applications. Take the classic problem of
mechanism design. As is well-known, private information can stand in the way of achieving
ﬁrst-best outcomes. Yet as Krajbich et al. [2009] have shown (both theoretically and
experimentally), one can potentially overcome those barriers by designing mechanisms that
determine outcomes as a function of both announcements and neural proxies for private
information, even when those proxies are imperfect.
Unfortunately, the neuroeconomics community has yet to produce a useful non-experimental
application involving the detection of private information. This state of aﬀairs is no acci-
dent. In a well-designed laboratory experiment, one can measure and manipulate private
information directly, so neural inference is redundant. In the ﬁeld, where private informa-
tion is not observable, opportunities for collecting pertinent neural measurements are rare.
Thus, it may be challenging to design an application that is both useful and feasible.
1.5 Do economic theories have testable implications concerning
neural processes?
Perhaps the most tantalizing claim concerning the potential prospects of neuroeconomics is
that an understanding of neural processes may provide economists with new opportunities to
formulate tests of both standard and nonstandard (behavioral) theories of decision making
(see, e.g., Camerer, 2007). The least controversial possibilities involve choice-oriented tests23
based on patterns of choices or choice proxies. Such a test might exploit the availability
of a new instrumental variable (as discussed in Section 1.4.1). Alternatively, if we discover
that particular neural responses reliably predict choices from sets of alternatives even when
no choice is oﬀered at the time of measurement (as discussed in Section 1.4.2), we could
perform tests using data on neural responses rather than actual choices, eﬀectively treating
the former as a proxy for the latter. In both cases, neuroeconomics would simply serve as
a tool for measuring important economic variables; given those variable, economists would
continue to apply conventional methods.
Some neuroeconomists have raised the more revolutionary possibility that, by peering
into the brain, we may discover how to falsify or validate theories of choice using informa-
tion concerning the structure of the neural processes behind choice.13 This section examines
the prospects for such process-oriented tests. I distinguish between two classes of economic
theories: those that invoke assumptions about choice patterns, and those that invoke as-
sumptions about thought processes. Process-oriented neural evidence is sometimes cited as
supporting or undermining theories belonging to the ﬁrst category, but the underlying argu-
ments tend to involve imprecise reasoning and conceptual leaps of faith, which undermines
the credibility of the agenda. Conceptually legitimate tests are conceivable, but the task
of laying a rigorous foundation for such a test is considerably more challenging than some
have suggested. The potential relevance of process-oriented neural evidence for theories
belonging to the second category is more readily apparent.
1.5.1 Testing theories that invoke assumptions about choice patterns
With some notable exceptions (which I discuss in the next subsection), most economic the-
ories of decision making invoke assumptions about choice patterns, and are agnostic with
13In light of recent technological advances, the prospects for uncovering the neural structure of the brain’s
decision-making apparatus have noticably improved. For example, using either microstimulation to induce
activity within a localized neural structure (a technique applied extensively in primate research, e.g., Hanks,
Ditterich, and Shadlen, 2006), or Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to temporarily shut down that
activity, in eﬀect simulating a lesion (e.g., as in Camus et al., 2008), neuroscientists can determine the causal
role which that localized activity plays in decision making.24
respect to the nature of decision processes. No explicit assumptions are made concerning
the inner workings of the brain. As an illustration, consider the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP), which lies at the core of standard decision theory. WARP holds that
an individual who chooses x but not y from a constraint set X ⊃ {x,y} will not choose y
from any other constraint set containing x. WARP is obviously a statement about choices;
it involves no assumption about the mechanical characteristics of the decision making pro-
cedure. More generally, our disciplinary agnosticism with respect to process accounts for
Gul and Pesendorfer’s [2008] contention that neural evidence cannot shed light on standard
economic hypotheses.
Of course, a choice axiom cannot hold unless the neural processes that govern choice
are capable of delivering decisions that conform to the axiom; thus, a mainstream economist
cannot remain entirely agnostic as to process. To take an extreme possibility, if neuroecono-
mists succeed in reducing all pertinent neural decision processes to a precise computational
algorithm, one would be able test any choice axiom. Obviously, by executing the algorithm
for a variety of choice problems, one could generate artiﬁcial choice data and perform con-
ventional choice-oriented tests. Alternatively, without actually executing the algorithm, one
might logically deduce from its properties whether it is consistent with the axiom, thereby
performing a process-oriented test.
In practice, neuroeconomics is very far from reducing the neural processes that govern the
complex decisions with which economists are conventionally concerned to precise algorithms,
especially for broad classes of environments. Existing algorithmic representations of such
processes pertain only to extremely simple tasks and functions. Yet even partial information
concerning the general decision algorithm might suﬃce for our purposes. Knowing only that
the algorithm belongs to a certain class, we might nevertheless be able to deduce either that
it must generate choices that conform to a given axiom, or that it cannot do so. While that
possibility is conceptually coherent, laying the necessary groundwork for such a test is likely
to prove extremely challenging.25
To illustrate the diﬃculties, consider the textbook model of economic decision making,
which implies that people behave as if they maximize utility. (I will focus on this example to
keep the discussion concrete; neural tests of other decision theories encounter similar prob-
lems.) Emerging evidence supports a neural maximization (NM) hypothesis, which holds
that an individual always chooses the alternative that elicits the highest level of activity
within certain brain structures during the process of deliberation (see, e.g., Padoa-Schioppa
and Assad, 2006, Plassmann, O’Doherty, and Rangel, 2007, Kable and Glimcher, 2007, Tom
et al., 2007, or Hare et al., 2008). Superﬁcially, support for the NM hypothesis may appear to
vindicate the textbook model by justifying a literal interpretation of utility maximization.14
However, because the NM hypothesis is consistent with any conceivable choice pattern, sup-
portive evidence sheds no light on the validity of WARP, and consequently neither bolsters
nor undermines the textbook model. Moreover, even if the NM hypothesis proves false, an
individual might nevertheless employ a choice algorithm that respects WARP, in which case
the textbook model would be valid. For example, she might make choices by sequentially
eliminating alternatives based on checklists of desirable properties, a possibility suggested
by various psychologists, including Tversky [1969], Bereby-Meyer, Assor and Katz [2004],
Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig [2006], and Katsikopoulos and Martignon [2006]. As
shown by Mandler, Manzini, and Mariotti [2008], such procedures satisfy WARP; indeed,
they can rationalize virtually the same set of choice patterns as utility maximization. There-
fore, even if the individual has no recognizable preferences, her behavior may still conform
to the textbook model. Because the NM hypothesis is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for
the validity of the textbook model, it cannot provide the basis for a formal test, at least by
itself.
The possibility remains that the NM hypothesis sets the stage for legitimate tests of
the textbook model and other economic theories. Consider, for example, the following
14For example, Kable and Glimcher [2007] write: “From an economic perspective, these ﬁndings indicate
the existence of a neural valuation process that is strikingly similar to the representations of subjective values
t h a ta r ee m p l o y e di nr e v e a l e dp r e f e r e n c et h e o r i e s . ”26
neural version of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (henceforth labeled NIIA): the
ordering of any two alternatives according to the level of activity they elicit in the pertinent
brain structures during the process of deliberation is unaﬀected by the availability of other
alternatives. Plainly, the NM and NIIA hypotheses together imply WARP. However, it
is important to bear in mind that neither condition is necessary for WARP. Indeed, even
if we treat neural maximization as a maintained hypothesis, WARP may be satisﬁed even
if NIIA is not. WARP permits context-speciﬁc reversals of the neural ordering provided
they are always conﬁned to unchosen alternatives. Inconsequential reversals might occur,
for example, if the brain attends to alternatives closely only if they appear to be serious
candidates in light of the opportunity set. When an alternative is plainly dominated within
an opportunity set, the level of neural activation it elicits during deliberation might then
be a noisy measure of “subjective value,” and thus the neural ordering of such alternatives
might be inconsequentially context-dependent.
Still, one might hope to bolster the textbook model by demonstrating that the NM and
NIIA hypotheses are both valid. The simplest approach is to measure activation in the
pertinent brain structures during deliberation for a collection of choice problems and check
for violations of those hypotheses. But that approach raises an obvious question: why
not skip the neural measurements and just examine the experimental choices to determine
whether they satisfy WARP? As long as the NM hypothesis holds, there will be consequential
reversals of the neural ordering if and only if the observed choices exhibit violations of WARP.
Thus, with respect to testing WARP, evidence concerning consequential neural reversals
simply reiterates what we already know from the choices.
Some might argue that experimental conﬁrmation of NIIA (speciﬁcally, the absence of
both consequential and inconsequential neural reversals) would provide insight into the struc-
ture of neural responses, and thereby justify greater subjective conﬁdence that WARP will
hold outside the test sample. But if choices satisfy WARP within the test sample, then
obviously the neural responses associated with those particular choices must satisfy some27
condition that is suﬃcient for WARP. Should we have more faith in WARP outside the test
sample simply because the suﬃcient neural condition for WARP that is satisﬁed within that
sample happens to be NIIA (in combination with NM), rather than something else?
An alternative approach is to develop tools for identifying and testing hypotheses con-
cerning features of the neural decision-making circuitry that have speciﬁc implications for
the pattern of brain activation during decision making. In combination with NM, conﬁrma-
tion of such a hypothesis would permit one to draw general inferences concerning choices. To
illustrate, suppose we deduce from the physical wiring of the brain that activation in response
to any alternative x will necessarily be given by a relationship of the form f(u(x,θ),X∪XH),
where X is the current opportunity set, XH is the union of recent opportunity sets, θ sum-
marizes other neural preconditions pertinent to choice (such as hunger), and f and u are
scalar-valued functions with f monotonically increasing in u. The hypothesized ﬁnding
along with NM would imply that the individual maximizes u(x,θ), with currently and re-
cently available alternatives normalizing the neural scale. WARP would follow immediately,
and with generality. The available evidence suggests that responses in the pertinent brain
structures may indeed take the hypothesized form: those responses depend on X and XH
(Tremblay and Schultz [1999]), but not on which alternatives are currently available when
X ⊂ XH (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad [2008]). Whether it is feasible to establish the gen-
erality of those properties (and/or others) by tying them to speciﬁc features of the neural
architecture that generates signals in the pertinent brain structures (as demanded by the
agenda outlined in this paragraph) remains to be seen.
Having discussed a particular example at some length, it is useful to describe what a
neural test of an “as-if” choice theory would entail more abstractly and generally. Each
possible neural architecture (or decision process), n, implements a particular computational
algorithm, a = A(n). In turn, every possible computational algorithm, a, implements a
particular choice correspondence, c = H(a). To formulate a rigorous neural test of the
economic hypothesis that an individual’s choice correspondence lies within some set Cx,28
deﬁned by a choice axiom x (such as WARP), we would need to identify testable features
of the set of neural architectures, Nx, that generate choice correspondences in Cx (formally,
Nx = {n | H(A(n)) ∈ Cx}). Let E denote the set of neural architectures that are consistent
with the available neural evidence; we reject the hypothesis that c ∈ Cx if E ∩Nx = ∅,a n d
fail to reject it if E ∩ Nx is non-empty. Naturally, this test has power only if there is some
other behavioral hypothesis of interest, corresponding to an alternative choice axiom y,f o r
which the testable features of Nx and Ny diﬀer.
For any x, characterizing the set Nx is likely to prove extremely challenging. However,
matters are not hopeless. Neuroeconomics will presumably progress by formulating and
testing increasingly speciﬁc theories of neural decision processes. We can express any such
theory in the form n ∈ T,w h e r eT is some set of neural architectures (for example, those
conforming to the NM hypothesis). Even if the set Nx is analytically intractable, we may
be able to usefully characterize the set T ∩ Nx. In that case, we could formulate direct
neural tests of x treating T as a maintained hypothesis. Neuroeconomic research could then
proceed along two complementary tracks: test T, and test x maintaining T.
The preceding discussion underscores the general proposition that a valid process-oriented
neural tests of any choice axiom will require a thorough understanding of the relationships
between the properties of choice mappings, the characteristics of decision algorithms, and
the features of neural architectures. Fundamentally, the problem is one of identiﬁcation:
we are asking whether it is possible to recover speciﬁc information concerning the choice
mapping from particular observations concerning the neural architecture. As a general
matter, the problem of identiﬁcation is one that economists have studied extensively and are
methodologically equipped to address. The standards for identiﬁcation in neuroeconomics
should be no diﬀerent than in other areas of economics. It is therefore disconcerting that some
neuroeconomists have proceeded (at least implicitly) as if the foundations for neural tests
of economic hypotheses are either obvious or easily motivated. Examples of neuroeconomic
results that have been incorrectly interpreted (sometimes by the authors but more often by29
others) as testing economic theories include the following.
Example #1: Dynamic inconsistency and quasihyperbolic discounting. M c C l u r ee ta l .
[2004] report that decisions activate distinct regions of the brain to diﬀering degrees de-
pending on whether they involve immediately available or delayed rewards. Moreover, the
pattern of activation does not vary signiﬁcantly with the amount of delay as long as re-
wards are not immediate.15 The paper is sometimes interpreted as providing a neural test
of the popular β-δ model of quasihyperbolic discounting. That interpretation is inappro-
priate. Even assuming that the observed neural activity encodes subjective valuations and
that those valuations govern decision making (hypotheses that are not addressed by this
particular experiment), the evidence does not rule out the possibility that the valuations are
time-consistent, or that any inconsistencies are harmonized by other structures.
A rigorous neural test of the β-δ model would require a careful examination of the rela-
tionships between choice patterns, computational algorithms, and neural processes. Even
without providing complete characterizations of those relationships, it is easy to see that
the evidence in McClure et al. [2004] cannot provide the basis for a valid test. We can
frame the issue as a computer programming task. It is plainly possible to write a program
that implements time-consistent decisions, but that nevertheless evaluates immediate and
delayed rewards in separate subroutines. Likewise, it is plainly possible to write a program
that implements time-inconsistent decisions, but that nevertheless evaluates immediate and
delayed rewards using precisely the same lines of code. Thus, evidence of this type is in-
herently incapable of distinguishing between the β-δ model and the conventional model of
time-consistent choice.
Though the discussion in McClure et al. [2004] is not completely clear on this point,16
a friendly reading of the paper suggests that the authors had in mind a more reasonable
15In a subsequent study, Kable and Glimcher [2007] reached diﬀerent conclusions. However, my focus here
is not on the neural evidence per se, but rather on the inferences concerning economic theories of choice that
one can validly draw from hypotheses involving neural processes (regardless of whether those hypotheses
ultimately prove to be right or wrong).
16Potential confusion arises because McClure et al. [2004] do not explicitly state whether β-δ behavior is
treated as a maintained hypothesis, or as part of a joint hypothesis.30
interpretation of the evidence. Speciﬁcally, under the maintained hypothesis that choices
conform to the β-δ model, they test the supplemental hypothesis that such choices are gener-
ated by a dual-system process, with limbic structures governing the evaluation of immediate
rewards, and the lateral prefrontal cortex and related structures governing the evaluation of
delayed rewards. Their evidence is certainly consistent with that supplemental hypothesis,
even though it sheds no light on the validity of the maintained hypothesis. Of course,
mainstream economics concerns itself with the maintained hypothesis, and not with the sup-
plemental hypothesis. Accordingly, the typical economist ﬁnds this paper fascinating, but
not particularly relevant.
Example #2: Altruism and “warm glow” giving. Harbaugh et al. [2005] report that
tax-like mandatory transfers to charity produce neural activity in areas of the brain that
have been linked to reward processing, and that voluntary transfers of the same magnitude
generate higher levels of that activity than mandatory transfers (see also Harbaugh et al.,
2008). The authors interpret those ﬁndings as evidence that the motivations for giving
include, respectively, pure altruism (in the case of the ﬁrst ﬁnding) and the “warm glow”
that ﬂows from voluntary self-sacriﬁce (in the case of the second). Unfortunately, that
interpretation is problematic. Even assuming that the measured neural activity cleanly
codes for “utility” (which is by no means apparent from the experiment), the “test” is
fundamentally ﬂawed because it reﬂe c t sc o n f u s i o nc o n c e r n i n gt h en a t u r eo fp u r ea l t r u i s m
and warm glow giving as economic hypotheses.
Economists who study altruism and voluntary giving (myself included) frequently moti-
vate, formulate, and describe their models in terms of utility and well-being. However, it is
important to remember that economic theories of giving remain rooted in choice. Econo-
mists do not abandon their standard framework when studying giving; instead, they simply
broaden the deﬁn i t i o n so ft h eo b j e c t so fc h o i c et oi n c l u d ee l e m e n t st h a ta ﬀect other people.
As a matter of fundamentals, speciﬁc hypotheses are still identiﬁed with choice patterns.
For the purpose of discussing the hypotheses at issue, I will deﬁne the typical object of31
choice as a triplet, (c,t,b),w h e r ec is private consumption, t is the size of the transfer from
the individual to a charity, and b is the total budget of the charity. The total transfer from
others, T, is implied as a residual: T = b − t. The hypothesis of pure altruism holds that
(c0,t 0,b 0) is chosen over (c00,t 00,b 00) iﬀ (c0,b t0,b 0) is chosen over (c00,b t00,b 00) for all t0, t00, b t0,a n d
b t00, so that preferences can be deﬁned over pairs of the form (c,b).( N o t e t h a t v a r i a t i o n s i n
t with b ﬁxed imply variations in T.) The hypothesis of pure warm glow giving holds that
(c0,t 0,b 0) is chosen over (c00,t 00,b 00) iﬀ (c0,t 0,b b0) is chosen over (c00,t 00,b b00) for all b0, b00, b b0,a n db b00,
so that preferences can be deﬁned over pairs of the form (c,t). Economists are interested in
these hypotheses because they have divergent positive implications, for example concerning
the degree to which public contributions crowd out private contributions.
Harbaugh et al. [2005] suggest that it is possible to detect the presence of pure altruism
by examining neural responses to an outcome when it is mandated (that is, when no choice
is involved), and to detect the presence of warm glow motives by comparing neural responses
when an outcome is voluntarily chosen and when it is mandated. However, because both
hypotheses (altruism and warm glow) pertain to choice patterns, neither has any implication
concerning well-being, feelings, or neural activity when choice is absent. Consequently, an
examination of such activity following mandates cannot reveal which motive lies behind
behavior.
These points require some elaboration. Formally, let U denote the utility function that
rationalizes the individual’s choices. To test the hypotheses of interest, we would attempt
to determine whether the arguments of U exclude b (for pure altruism) or t (for warm glow
giving). That is not what Harbaugh et al. [2005] do; indeed, in their experiment, b and t
do not vary independently. Rather, they implicitly posit the existence of another function,
call it W, that measures well-being when outcomes are mandated, and they attempt to
test two hypotheses using neural data: ﬁrst, that the arguments of W exclude b and t
(by examining whether mandated contributions produce elevated activity); second, that
W = U (by examining whether mandated and voluntary contributions produce the same32
level of activity). Even if we provisionally accept the premise that those hypotheses are
meaningful and testable,17 they have no positive implications concerning choice (because
behavior conforms to U,n o tW), and therefore cannot diﬀerentiate between behavioral
theories.
Taken at face value, the evidence in Harbaugh et al. [2005] rejects the hypothesis that the
arguments of W exclude b and t, in that a mandated contribution elevates neural reward-
related activity, as well as the hypothesis that W = U, in that a voluntary contribution
elevates neural reward-related activity more than a mandated contribution. The authors
construe the ﬁrst pattern as evidence of pure altruism and the second as evidence of a warm
glow motivation. In their view, an individual would only experience a warm glow if she made
a contribution voluntarily; thus, elevated activity from a mandatory contribution must be
attributable to altruism. They also assume that a pure altruist would beneﬁt equally from
a contribution regardless of whether it was voluntary or mandated; hence, greater elevation
with a voluntary contribution must be attributable to a warm glow. But those adden-
dums are not part of the economic warm glow and pure altruism hypotheses. The utility
rationalization for warm glow hypothesis holds only that, ceteris paribus, larger voluntary
contributions lead to greater satisfaction over some range with the charity’s total budget
held ﬁxed. It is inherently mute as to whether larger involuntary contributions lead to the
same gains in satisfaction, and is therefore consistent with the possibility that contributions
lead to the same warm glow regardless of whether they are voluntary or involuntary. Thus,
rejecting the hypothesis that the arguments of W exclude t and b does not favor pure al-
truism over warm glow giving. Likewise, the utility rationalization for the pure altruism
hypothesis holds only that, ceteris paribus, larger voluntary contributions lead to greater
satisfaction over some range when the charity’s budget varies dollar-for-dollar with the con-
tribution. It is entirely consistent with the possibility that larger budgets lead to greater
gains in satisfaction when they result from voluntary rather than involuntary contributions
17There are conceptual problems with neural measures of well-being, which I discuss in Section 2.1.33
(e.g., because discretion is valued). Thus, rejecting the hypothesis that W = U does not
favor warm glow giving over pure altruism. At best, that evidence speaks to a normative
proposition concerning the intrinsic value of free choice, not to positive questions concerning
behavior.
1.5.2 Testing theories that involve assumptions about thought processes
Within the subﬁeld of behavioral economics, some theories of decision making invoke as-
sumptions about thought processes — particularly regarding the types of factual information
considered or ignored, or the manner in which it is processed — rather than choice patterns.18
Leading examples include theories of reasoning in games, as well as models of memory, atten-
tion, and learning. While one could argue that those theories admit “as-if” interpretations,
in most cases their positive implications seem diﬃcult to justify if not far-fetched unless
one takes the thought-process assumptions literally.19 Consequently, formal tests of those
assumptions have a legitimate and potentially important place in positive behavioral eco-
nomics.
Recent experimental work by Costa-Gomez and Crawford [2006] exempliﬁes this agenda
(see also Chong, Camerer, and Ho, 2004). Behavioral game theorists have proposed several
competing models of strategic reasoning to account for the prevalence of non-equilibrium
choices among subjects who have no previous experience playing particular games. Leading
candidates include “level k thinking” (Lk) and “level k dominance” (Dk).20 Costa-Gomez
18According to Sen [1973], even the standard textbook model of decision making involves thought-process
assumptions: “the rationale of the revealed preference approach lies in the assumption of revelation and not
in doing away with the notion of underlying preferences, despite occasional noises to the contrary.” Sen
reasoned that the consistency axioms upon which economists usually rely have no force unless one assumes
that preferences actually drive choices. His argument ignores the fact that certain classes of mechanistic
decision processes can generate choice correspondences that satisfy the same consistency axioms, as noted
in Section 1.5.1.
19In addition, thought-process assumptions sometimes have important normative implications. For ex-
ample, one might evaluate welfare diﬀerently depending on whether an individual actually ignores certain
types of information, or simply acts as if she ignores that information. I turn to normative issues in Section
2.
20In a two-player game, a level 1 thinker (L1) best-responds to a uniform prior over her partner’s decisions;
a level k thinker (Lk) best-responds to a level k-1 thinker. Level k dominance (Dk) implies that a player
performs k rounds of deleting dominated strategies and then best-responds to a uniform prior over her34
and Crawford categorize subjects according to those theories (and a few others) by studying
each subject’s choices and information search patterns across a collection of sixteen two-
person guessing games. Each game is characterized by six parameters: an upper and lower
b o u n do ne a c hp l a y e r ’ sc h o i c e ,a n dt w os c a l a r st h a td e ﬁne each player’s target as a multiple
of the other’s choice. The games are chosen to generate a high degree of diﬀerentiation
between the choice patterns predicted by each theory.
Using a computer interface known as Mouselab, Costa-Gomez and Crawford observed the
order in which subjects looked up the parameters of each game while deliberating. Those
search patterns are relevant because each theory has a natural procedural interpretation. For
example, it is natural to assume that an L1 player will look up parameters in the following
order: her opponent’s bounds, her own target parameter, her own bounds. In contrast,
an L2 player will follow a diﬀerent search pattern: her own bounds, her opponent’s target
parameter, her opponent’s bounds, her own target parameter (at which point she may also
remind herself of her own bounds). Costa-Gomez and Crawford treat those procedural
assumptions as maintained hypotheses.21 They classify subjects according to the theory that
most likely accounts for the observed data — either their choices alone, or both their choices
and search patterns, allowing for noise in both. Consideration of the data on information
search patterns leads them to reclassify a sizable group of subjects.22
Of course, one can acknowledge Mouselab’s value while doubting the usefulness of brain
scans and biometric measurements. The point of the preceding discussion is simply to
establish that one can test certain economic theories of decision making using evidence on
thought processes, either instead of or in addition to choice patterns. If, as Crawford [2008]
poetically suggests, we turn to Mouselab because it allows us to peer through “windows of
opponent’s remaining alternatives.
21It is therefore worth noting that a player with a suﬃciently good memory could look up a game’s
parameters in any order irrespective of the model of reasoning that accounts for his behavior. Thus, in
any given instance, Costa-Gomez and Crawford could discard one theory of strategic reasoning in favor of
another because their procedural assumption, and not the ﬁrst theory, is incorrect.
22Because their method does not generate measures of statistical conﬁdence in the subjects’ classiﬁcations,
they do not provide a formal test of any theory (that is, a probability statement concerning its validity) for
any particular subject.35
the strategic soul,” then it makes sense to seek larger and clearer windows. Whether more
advanced technologies will permit us to gather pertinent information on thought processes,
particularly regarding the processing of factual information, certainly remains to be seen,
but that possibility cannot be dismissed.
Recent work by Coricelli and Nagel [2008] hints at the new “windows” that more advanced
technique may open. Their study shows that, relative to subjects who are classiﬁed as
low-level strategic thinkers according to their behavior, those who are classiﬁed as high-
level strategic thinkers have considerably greater activation in areas of the brain that tend
to engage when a subject is instructed to think about a situation from another person’s
perspective (speciﬁcally, the dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, abbreviated mPFC).
Certainly, that evidence provides no more than a hint concerning thought processes. Based
on what we currently know, we cannot rule out the possibility that a subject might engage in
high-level strategic reasoning with unremarkable mPFC activation, or in low-level strategic
thinking despite pronounced mPFC activation. Consequently, Coricelli and Nagel’s evidence
does not provide an adequate foundation for testing formally between theories of strategic
reasoning — at least not without strong maintained hypothesis in which we may have very
little a priori conﬁdence.23 Still, it is a beginning. A neural counterpart to Mouselab
(for example, a scanning procedure that registers the use of particular factual information)
would have obvious value for economists seeking to test theories of strategic reasoning; that
said, no such counterpart currently exists, nor can we be conﬁdent that it will exist in the
foreseeable future.
Theories that invoke assumptions about thought processes are not conﬁned to pure strate-
gic reasoning. Other examples include models of memory (such as Mullainathan, 2002),
attention to information (such as Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), and learning (such as Erev
and Roth, 1998). Non-choice evidence concerning the validity of various underlying thought
23On the other hand, as long as we have some reason to credit those maintained hypotheses, the type of
neural observations studied by Coricelli and Nagel are potentially useful for reﬁning (or enhancing conﬁdence
in) subjects’ classiﬁcations, and hence for forecasting choices out of sample.36
process assumptions already exists, and indeed is commonly cited as justiﬁcation for those
assumptions. Neural methods can in principle contribute additional evidence. For example,
Mullainathan cites Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell [1991] to provide a neurobiological basis for
his assumption concerning the importance of rehearsal in memory. Similarly, the hypothesis
that choice depends upon particular information could be falsiﬁed by evidence demonstrat-
ing the absence of neural responses upon presentation of that information. Regardless of
whether useful tests prove diﬃcult to formulate and implement in practice, there is nothing
conceptually wrong with the agenda.
1.6 Can an understanding of neural processes usefully guide model
selection?
The number of empirical models an economist could construct to describe any particular
decision as a function of conventional explanatory variables is vast. Even if neuroeconomics
does not provide new variables of interest (the topic of Section 1.4) or an independent foun-
dation for testing one model against another (the topic of Section 1.5), it could conceivably
generate suggestive ﬁndings that informally guide the search for an appropriate empirical
model in useful directions, leading to more rapid and eﬀective identiﬁcation of the best pre-
dictive relationship. I will discuss the two main aspects of model selection: variable selection
and the choice of functional form.
Variable selection. Neuroeconomic evidence could in principle motivate the inclusion of
particular conventional variables in speciﬁc behavioral models. Suppose, for example, that
mandated transfers to others inﬂuence brain activity in centers linked to reward-processing,
as the evidence in Harbaugh et al. (2005) suggests. While such evidence would not prove
that altruism motivates behavior, it might well suggest such a hypothesis to an empirical
economist, who might then investigate the descriptive and predictive power of behavioral
models that incorporate related variables (e.g., measures of potential externalities). Simi-
larly, an examination of neural evidence concerning the processes that govern attention might
suggest that consumers are potentially susceptible to tax illusion, and that they will respond37
diﬀerently depending on whether a product is tagged with tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive
prices. Such evidence might lead an empirical economist to examine empirical models that
separately include explanatory variables measuring posted prices and hidden taxes.
While acknowledging the possibilities described in the preceding paragraph, a skeptic
might nevertheless question whether neuroeconomics is likely to make such contributions
in practice. Empirical economists have other sources of guidance and inspiration, such as
introspection and research from psychology. Indeed, neural studies such as Harbaugh et
al. [2005] are themselves motivated by hypotheses imported from other ﬁelds. I doubt
that Harbaugh et al. [2005] would have searched for neural correlates of altruism had other
work in the social sciences (which they cite) not pointed toward altruism as a signiﬁcant
motivational factor. Likewise, economists formulated and tested conjectures concerning
tax illusion based on a common-sense understanding of attention, without the beneﬁto f
neuroeconomic evidence; see in particular Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2007), and Finkelstein
(2007). Empirical economists who are not persuaded to investigate the roles of pertinent
variables in behavioral relationships on the basis of other considerations are unlikely to be
convinced by the neural evidence. To motivate the inclusion of an important explanatory
variable that empirical economists have otherwise ignored, a neuroeconomist would literally
have to come across some signiﬁcant and unexpected environmental correlate of brain activity.
I do not dismiss that possibility, but neither does it alone convince me that the ﬁeld holds
great potential for conventional positive economic analyses of decision making.
Even if research on the neurobiology of decision making had provided the impetus for
investigating altruism, tax illusion, or some other phenomenon, it seems unlikely that an
empirical strategy for estimating the function η would have been inﬂuenced by the details
of the neurobiological evidence. Rather, that evidence would have merely motivated (to use
Gul and Pesendorfer’s term) an examination of functional forms that include the pertinent
variables. It is not at all obvious that an economist who possesses a deep understanding of
the motivating scientiﬁc evidence would be any better equipped to estimate η than one who38
simply apprehends the pertinent psychological principles intuitively.
In addition to suggesting that certain variables may play roles in particular behavioral
relationships, neuroeconomic evidence may also indicate that others play no role. Such
evidence could motivate exclusion restrictions. Indeed, formal neural tests of exclusion re-
strictions are conceivable in principle, even without precise knowledge of the computational
algorithms that govern decision-making. We can once again frame the issue as a computer
programming task. To implement a choice mapping that depends on a particular variable,
computer code must reference that variable. For any neural process that implements the
same computational algorithm, there must presumably be some neural response to the vari-
able’s value. Consequently, the absence of any response would formally justify an exclusion
restriction in the behavioral relationship.
T h ec h o i c eo ff u n c t i o n a lf o r m . In principle, the nature of neurobiological response
mechanisms may suggest particular empirical speciﬁcations. For example, there is some
evidence that temporal diﬀerence reinforcement learning (TDRL) models accurately describe
the operation of neural systems governing dopamine learning (Schultz, Dayan, and Montague,
1997, and Schultz, 1998, 2000). These parsimonious, tightly parameterized learning models
could guide the formulation of empirical behavioral relationships in settings that involve the
accumulation of experience. Because other learning processes may also inﬂuence choices,
the neural evidence cannot prove that one functional form is better than another for the
purpose of predicting behavior. However, it could lead economists to examine particular
parsimonious speciﬁcations that they might not otherwise consider, and some of these may
outperform more conventional alternatives.
A mere catalog of such possibilities will never suﬃce to convince the skeptics, nor should
it. Mainstream economists should acknowledge the conceptual possibilities discussed above,
and exercise intellectual tolerance and patience while neuroeconomists explore them. Neu-
roeconomists should recognize in turn that the burden of proof is squarely on their shoul-
ders. Skeptical reactions deﬁne a speciﬁcc h a l l e n g e :Provide an example of a novel economic39
model derived originally from neuroeconomic research that improves our measurement of the
causal relationship between a standard exogenous environmental condition — one with which
economists have been historically concerned — and a standard economic choice. Unless the
neuroeconomics community eventually rises to that challenge, the possibilities discussed in
this section will eventually be dismissed as unfounded speculation.
1.7 Can neuroeconomics improve out-of-sample predictions?
Sometimes, economists wish to predict behavior under completely novel conditions (for ex-
ample, a new and untried public policy). There is no assurance that reduced form behavioral
models will perform well in such contexts, especially if the novel conditions are qualitatively
distinct from any that have preceded them. In contrast, a good structural model, based on
a deeper understanding of behavior, may permit reasonable projections even when funda-
mental environmental changes occur. Many neuroeconomists hope their ﬁeld will provide
such models.
By way of analogy, suppose a computer has been programmed to make selections for
choice problems that fall into a number of distinct and highly diﬀerentiated categories, but
the tasks for which we have observed its choices belong to a subset of those categories. We
could potentially develop a good positive model, conceivably along the lines of standard
economic theories (e.g., utility maximization), that predicts the computer’s choices for prob-
lems within the categories for which we have data. However, based on that limited data,
projecting choices for problems within the remaining categories is guesswork. Now suppose
that someone obtains the computer code. In that case, even without additional choice data,
we could accurately predict the computer’s decisions in all circumstances. When neuroe-
conomists suggest that an understanding of the brain’s computational algorithms will permit
more reliable out-of-sample behavioral predictions, they are making an analogous claim.
Unfortunately, the issue is not quite so straightforward. The analogy is convincing only
if we assume that the totality of all decision processes within the brain will be reduced to
a precise computational algorithm. As long as neuroeconomists only succeed in mapping a40
subset of the brain’s neural circuitry to computational algorithms, out-of-sample prediction
will remain problematic. To pursue the analogy a bit further, suppose we obtain the code
only for certain subroutines that are activated when the computer solves problems falling
within the categories for which we have data. There is no guarantee that it will activate
the same subroutines for related purposes when confronting problems within the remaining
categories, particularly if those problems are qualitatively diﬀerent from the ones previously
encountered. Without knowing how the entire program operates, including the full array of
subroutines upon which it can call, as well as the conditions under which it activates each
of them, one cannot simulate its operation in fundamentally new environments.
Of course, one can proceed based on the assumption that the brain will continue to
use the same neural circuitry in the same ways when confronting new classes of decision
problems. But there is no way to test that assumption until out-of-sample observations
become available, and no guarantee of greater stability at the neural level than at the behav-
ioral level.24 If, for example, secondary (and normally quiescent) neural systems override a
primary system whenever the latter would generate behavior too far from the individual’s
norm, then an incomplete neural model of choice (speciﬁcally, one that omits the secondary
systems) might be less stable out of sample than a behavioral model. By way of analogy,
structural models of reasoning in games have notoriously performed poorly out of sample,
apparently because reasoning is highly context-speciﬁc. Whether we would be better oﬀ
making out-of-sample predictions from structural neural models rather than structural be-
havioral models is therefore a factual question that can only be settled through experience,
and not through logical arguments.
Still, there are reasons to hope that consideration of evidence on neural processes might
a tl e a s th e l pu ss e l e c te c o n o m i cm o d e l st h a ta r em o r er e l i a b l ef o rt h ep u r p o s eo fm a k i n go u t -
of-sample projections. Imagine, for example, that an estimated within-sample behavioral
24Just as a structural economic model can be viewed as a reduced form for a structural neural model, any
structural neural model can also be viewed as a reduced form for some deeper structure, and the stability of
the neural reduced form over classes of environments will depend on how that deeper structure operates.41
relationship is equally consistent with several distinct structural economic models, each of
which has a diﬀerent out-of-sample behavioral implication. Suppose the available neural
evidence informally persuades us (but does not prove) that one of those models is more likely
to match reality. Then we might reasonably hope to obtain more accurate out-of-sample
predictions from the preferred model.
As an example, consider once again the ﬁndings of Coricelli and Nagel [2008], discussed
in Section 1.5.2. Suppose a subject’s observed choices are consistent with both L1 and L2
thinking (because the within-sample games were not chosen to diﬀerentiate between those
theories), but that we can rule out other models of strategic reasoning. Now imagine we are
asked to predict the subject’s choices out of sample in games for which the L1 and L2 models
have diﬀerent implications. Choices alone provide no basis for preferring one model over the
other. But suppose a brain scan taken during within-sample deliberation reveals a high level
of mPFC activity. That ﬁnding would not prove the individual engaged in high level strategic
t h i n k i n gw i t h i ns a m p l e ,l e ta l o n et h a th ew o u l dd os oo u to fs a m p l ei nc l e a r l yd i ﬀerentiated
settings. Even so, we would presumably take the previously documented correlation between
mPFC activity and high-level strategic reasoning into account when forecasting his choices,
and place greater weight on predictions derived from the L2 model.
All these possibilities are of course speculative. Mainstream economists will relinquish
their skepticism only when confronted with examples of superior out-of-sample prediction
in contexts involving the types of environmental conditions and behaviors that economist
ordinarily study.
1.8 An overall assessment
In pondering the future of neuroeconomics, I see substantial likelihood that the ﬁeld will make
intellectually legitimate contributions to the positive economic analysis of decision making.
While there is reason to hope that some of the contributions will prove noteworthy, at this
point in time neither the ﬁeld’s actual accomplishments nor my speculative musings persuade
me that it is likely to become a central or indispensable component of standard positive42
economics, or that it will revolutionize the ﬁeld in some fundamental way. Whether that
assessment reﬂects the ﬁeld’s actual limitations or the deﬁcient imagination of a relatively
mild skeptic remains to be seen; I hope I am proven wrong.
2 Normative economics
Any contribution of neuroeconomics to normative economics would presumably take one of
two forms. First, neuroeconomics might play a role in the development of an entirely new
approach to measuring an individual’s welfare, one that evaluates her well-being based at
least in part on her neural activity rather than her choices. Second, neuroeconomic research
might allow economists to improve choice-based welfare analysis without abandoning the
standard normative paradigm. I will consider each of these possibilities in turn.
2.1 Can neuroeconomics oﬀer an alternative to choice-based wel-
fare analysis?
Prior to the revealed preference revolution, classical economists such as Francis Edgeworth,
Frank Ramsey, and Irving Fisher speculated about the possibility of measuring utility directly
(see Colander, 2005). Will neuroeconomics provide us with the technology to make such
measurements, and ultimately replace choice-based welfare analysis with a new utilitarian
paradigm? Even allowing for technological advances, I see fundamental conceptual problems
with that agenda.
The central premise for “neural utilitarianism” — that welfare is reducible to neural im-
pulses — has disconcerting implications. Picture a world in which a malevolent authority
surreptitiously attaches everyone to a machine that replicates the full spectrum of neural
activity associated with a lifetime of highly pleasurable and satisfying experiences while ex-
ploiting them for a dark purpose. I wager that this prospect is almost universally abhorrent;
as far as I know, no one roots for the machines in the ﬁlm The Matrix (Warner Bros. and
Village Roadshow Pictures, 1999). Though such nightmare scenarios are the stuﬀ of science43
ﬁction,25 they make the point that any compelling notion of welfare must encompass more
than neural impulses. We often consider ourselves better oﬀ when we have actual autonomy,
liberty, and a ﬁrm grasp on reality even if, as a consequence, we must relinquish appealing
illusions and experience less pleasurable neurobiological sensations. Consideration of those
intangibles leads to a welfare paradigm based on informed choice rather than brain activity.
If despite my squeamishness we are nevertheless determined to construct a neural welfare
index, we must ﬁr s tc o n f r o n ta n do v e r c o m ea tl e a s tﬁve conceptual and practical challenges.
The ﬁrst challenge is to identify regions of the brain that generate welfare-relevant neural
responses. Unfortunately, those regions are not etched with functional labels. To proceed,
we require criteria for determining whether activity in a particular portion of the brain
reﬂects pleasure, pain, or something else entirely. I will return to that central issue shortly.
The second challenge is to assure ourselves that we have not neglected any brain re-
gions in which neural activity codes for important aspects of well-being. Even if we can
prove that certain types of neural activity are welfare-relevant (leaving aside for the moment
the issue of how we might reach such a determination), the task of demonstrating that no
other type of neural activity reﬂects any other aspect of well-being is likely to prove far
less tractable. There is a risk that a neural welfare index will focus disproportionately on
the welfare-relevant signals that are most easily identiﬁable and measurable. Economists
might unitentionally overemphasize certain aspects of well-being (possibly physical sensa-
tions) while underemphasizing others (possibly abstract emotions).
T h et h i r dc h a l l e n g ei st oﬁlter out spurious signals within brain regions that manifest
welfare-relevant neural activity. The neural circuitry that registers welfare-relevant signals
may also be involved in other cognitive functions, in which case neural measures of well-
being may contain spurious components. One can of course treat the resulting noise as
measurement error, but the signal-to-noise ratio may be low and the noise may be non-
random (for example, it may be systematically related to features of the environment, such
25At least, that is what the machines would like us to believe.44
as complexity).
The fourth challenge is to devise an objective criterion for aggregating welfare-relevant
neural signals in diﬀerent brain regions into a single index of well-being. We might hope
to discover that brain itself aggregates well-being and codes it as a single type of neural
activity. But what type of evidence would allow us to distinguish that activity from the
aggregated components? If, as seems more likely, the neural aggregator either fails to exist
or is impossible to identify, we would be forced to adopt principles of aggregation for which
there is no neural foundation.
The ﬁfth challenge is to devise an objective criterion for aggregating welfare-relevant
neural signals over time. Suppose an individual must choose between two alternatives, A
and B, with consequences at dates 0 and 1. Imagine optimistically that we discover how
the brain codes an overall sense of well-being at each moment in time. Let ui
t denote the
coded level of well-being for activity i at time t.I f uA
0 >u B
0 ,a n duB
1 >u A
1 , is the individual
better oﬀ with alternative A or B?I f t h e v a l u e o f ui
0 is unrelated to the value of ui
1 (so
we can interpret ui
0 as a measure of ﬂow utility, rather than a forward-looking index of well-
being), how would we aggregate ui
0 and ui
1?I f t h e v a l u e o f ui
0 i sf o u n dt ov a r yw i t ht h e
value of ui
1 (so it appears to be forward looking to some degree), is it then appropriate to
base welfare judgments entirely on ui
0 and ignore ui
1? How would we determine whether
this eﬀect reﬂects aggregation of feelings at diﬀerent points in time, or immediate feelings
driven by anticipated outcomes (in which case aggregation would still be necessary)? What
principles would we use to determine whether ui
0 aggregates appropriately?
The ﬁrst challenge is the most fundamental but in some ways least problematic. To
identify regions of the brain that generate welfare-relevant neural responses, we must of
necessity ultimately rely on correlations with directly interpretable indicators of welfare —
speciﬁcally, either choices or expressions of well-being (such as self-reported happiness, life
satisfaction, and related concepts, all of which I will henceforth subsume under the heading
of “happiness” for the sake of brevity). In other words, we classify a particular type of brain45
activity as pleasurable only because people consistently choose alternatives that generate
it, or because they report pleasure while experiencing it. Accordingly, while I can imagine
that neural methods may eventually build upon choice-based and/or happiness-based welfare
analysis, I do not see how they could spawn an entirely new and conceptually independent
approach to welfare. For the rest of this section, I will focus on ways in which neural
methods might build upon happiness-based welfare analysis; I discuss potential contributions
to choice-based welfare analysis in Section 2.2.
In my view, self-reported happiness does not by itself provide an adequate foundation
for rigorous welfare analysis. Though a full discussion of my objections to happiness-based
w e l f a r ea n a l y s i si sb e y o n dt h es c o p eo ft h i sp a p e r ,Io ﬀer the following example (and refer
the interested reader to Bernheim [2009] for a more complete discussion). When we ask
people to express their happiness using a unitless scale (e.g., one to seven), we compel them
to invent their own normalizations; they decide for themselves what each potential response
signiﬁes. The chosen normalization may well depend on aspects of the environment. For
example, people may use the mid-point of the scale to denote a “typical” state of happiness
within some context-speciﬁc domain. Once we admit the natural possibility that people
use context-speciﬁc normalizations, identifying changes in underlying happiness from data
on self-reported happiness becomes highly problematic.
C o n t r i b u t o r st ot h eh a p p i n e s sl i t e r a t u r eh a v ei n f o r m a l l ys u g g e s t e dt h a tw ec a nv a l i d a t e
and/or enhance the reliability of happiness analysis by integrating neural data. For example,
they argue that correlations between self-reported feelings, biometric variables, and neural
measurements corroborate the use of such objects as indicia of well-being (see, e.g., Larsen
and Fredrickson, 1999). But that argument is circular; it demonstrates only that the
variables in question have something in common, not that they individually or collectively
reﬂect true well-being.
For my part, I doubt that neural methods can build upon happiness analysis in a way
t h a tl e a d st oav i a b l ea n dr i g o r o u sw e l f a r ef r a m e w o r k . T h ec a s ef o rt h a ta p p r o a c hr e s t so n46
the implicit premise that we can judge whether a given alternative to a standard happiness
index brings us closer to a measure of true well-being. But true well-being is not directly
measurable (assuming we reject the notion that choices perfectly reveal preferences). How
then can we ever hope to satisfy the premise? The fact that the hypothesized alternative
would involve neural data (either in addition to or instead of self-reported happiness) is of
no particular consequence. As I have emphasized, neural activity in particular brain regions
is considered welfare-relevant only because it correlates with either choice or self-reported
happiness. On the one hand, if we focus on brain regions that are considered welfare-
relevant because neural activity has been found to correlate with choice, and if we then
use information concerning that activity to “improve” self-reported measures of happiness,
we are essentially taking the position that correlates of choice trump self-reports, in which
case choice is presumably the best indicator of well-being. On the other hand, if we focus
exclusively on brain regions that are considered welfare-relevant because neural activity has
been found to correlate with self-reported happiness, then it is diﬃcult to see how we could
use information concerning that activity to determine when self-reports are unreliable, let
alone to improve them, or to judge whether particular alternatives constitute improvements.
It is useful to restate my objection using the formal language of identiﬁcation. I will de-
ﬁne an environment, E, to consist of the external processes that govern experiences, as well
as all welfare-relevant preconditions. An environment may or may not present an individual
with decisions (present and future), and the preconditions may include past choices. An
environment maps to a vector of neural signals, s = S(E), which pertain to sensations asso-
ciated with physical states (such as hunger and fatigue), abstract emotions (such as shame
or relief), or feelings induced by expectations of future sensations. I allow for the possi-
bility that internal well-being, u, depends both on neural signals and on the environment:
u = V (s,E).I i n c l u d e E as an argument of U because the nature of the environment (e.g.,
whether the individual has autonomy) may color hedonic experience. Whether or not V
depends directly on E, we can write well-being as a function of the environment and nothing47
else:
u = U(E) ≡ V (S(E),E). (2)
The mapping U is not observed. Our central objective is to identify it up to a monotonic
transformation, so we can rank environments according to the well-being they generate.
Let h denote self-reported happiness. Reports presumably depend on well-being, but
they may also depend directly on speciﬁc sensations (e.g., if a particular feeling is salient when
the question is posed) and/or aspects of the environment (e.g., if the respondent normalizes
the happiness scale based on recent experience). Thus, I write h = R(u,s,E).N o t i c e t h a t
we can write h as a function of E alone:
h = H(E) ≡ R(U(E),S(E),E). (3)
By assessing self-reported happiness in a wide range of environments, we can ob-
serve the mapping H. By taking neural measurements, we also observe components of the
mapping S. The question before us is whether we can recover the mapping U from that
information.
Having formulated the problem in this way, it should be obvious that identiﬁcation is
hopeless without further restrictions. In particular, for any mappings U, H,a n dS,t h e r e
exists functions R and V (neither of which is directly observable) such that equations (2)
and (3) hold. For example, R and V might depend only on E, in which case one can simply
take V (E)=U(E) and R(E)=H(E). Even if we insist that well-being is responsive to
neural signals and that self-reported happiness is responsive to well-being, we are no better
oﬀ.26
The preceding discussion poses a straightforward challenge to those who advocate supple-
menting happiness-based welfare analysis with neural data: explicitly state the mathematical
assumptions that permit us to fully or partially identify true well-being from available data,
26To see why, consider the possibility that V and R might be separable: V (s,E)=V1(s)+V2(E),a n d
R(u,s,E)=R1(u)+ R2(s)+R3(E). For any U, H, S, V1, R1,a n dR2, one can simply take V2(E)=
U(E) − V1(S(E)) and R3(E)=H(E) − R1(U(E)) − R2(U(S(E))).48
and justify them. Identifying restrictions certainly exist; for example, assuming that greater
well-being leads to higher levels of reported happiness (monotonicity of R in u), and that
those reports do not depend directly on either sensations or the environment (invariance of
R with respect to s and E), rankings according to u and h plainly coincide, so H alone
identiﬁes U up to a monotonic transformation (R). However, those identifying restrictions
are untenable, as are all others I have considered; see Bernheim [2009] for details.
These various issues must, of necessity, undermine the conﬁdence one can reasonably
have in any neural welfare measure. To put the matter starkly, suppose that when the
available alternatives are A and B, the individual chooses A regardless of how or when the
choice is presented (in other words, it is impossible to induce him to choose B over A),27
while the neural welfare measure points unambiguously to alternative B. Personally, I
would be unwilling to overrule the individual’s choice and declare him better oﬀ with B.
On the contrary, I would be inclined to assume that the neural measure overlooked some
consideration that was important to the individual.
2.2 Can neuroeconomics improve choice-based welfare analysis?
Naturally, one can also raise objections to the choice-based normative methods of standard
economics, including the following two diﬃculties. First, many people appear to make incon-
sistent choices. Indeed, much of empirical behavioral economics involves the identiﬁcation
of seemingly irrelevant changes in conditions that lead to choice reversals: an individual
chooses option A over option B under one condition, and option B over option A under
another. Typical examples include the point in time at which a choice is made (dynamic
inconsistency), the manner in which information is presented, the labeling of a particular
option as the status quo, or exposure to an anchor (for a survey, see Rabin, 1998). If choices
are inconsistent, how can they serve as a coherent basis for making normative judgments?
Second, economists sometimes attempt to make normative statements concerning options
27One can of course induce an individual to choose the option labeled B over the one labeled A through
coercion or by oﬀering inducements. But in that case the actual objects of choice are no longer A and B.49
for which no choice data are available. This problem arises most prominently in the context
of environmental economics. For example, how can we put an economic value on the
environmental damage caused by an oil spill? The typical consumer does not make any
choices involving signiﬁcant changes in the likelihood of oil spills, nor is it practical to
oﬀer such choices experimentally. One standard approach, contingent valuation, involves
hypothetical questions. But the hypothetical nature of the exercise induces a potentially
large bias (see, e.g., the review in List and Shogren, 2002), and answers are sensitive to the
details of elicitation protocols (List et al., 2004). How then can we reliably evaluate welfare
using choice as a foundation when no actual choices are available?
In this section, I argue that neuroeconomics may help to address both problems.
2.2.1 Normative analysis when choices conﬂict
Some scholars have argued that evidence of inconsistent choice patterns overturns the hy-
pothesis that choice reveals meaningful preferences and undermines the legitimacy of welfare
judgments based on choice (e.g., Kahneman, 1999, Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2003).
Their objection is based on the false premise that choice-based welfare analysis requires a
rationalization of choice (in other words, utility or preferences), and that the associated nor-
mative judgments must respect that rationalization, rather than choice itself. Elsewhere,
Antonio Rangel and I have argued that choice-based welfare analysis requires no rationaliza-
tion for behavior (Bernheim and Rangel, 2007, 2008, 2009). When choice lacks a consistent
rationalization, the normative guidance it provides may be ambiguous in some circumstances,
but unambiguous in others. As our work demonstrates, this partially ambiguous guidance
provides a suﬃcient foundation for rigorous welfare analysis.
Formally, we have developed a framework for welfare analysis based on a binary individ-
ual welfare relation P∗,d e ﬁned (informally) as follows: xP ∗y iﬀ y is never chosen (within the
welfare-relevant choice domain) when both x and y are available. That relation need not
be either complete or transitive, but it is always acyclic, which suﬃces for welfare analysis.
Interested readers can ﬁnd a more complete justiﬁcation for this approach, as well as prop-50
erties of the binary relation, generalizations of the standard tools of applied welfare analysis,
and applications to speciﬁc behavioral models, in Bernheim and Rangel [2009].
When choice conﬂicts are severe, our framework remains applicable, but our welfare crite-
rion may not be particularly discerning. If we could ﬁnd an objective basis for disqualifying
certain choices (that is, for removing them from the welfare-relevant choice domain), the
severity of choice conﬂicts would diminish, and our criterion would become more discerning.
But how can we disqualify choices while remaining true to the tenets of choice-based welfare
analysis? The answer is that those tenets only require respect for informed choices. As I
explain below, standard welfare analysis actually requires us to disqualify or appropriately
reinterpret choices upon determining from an examination of the facts (or apparent facts)
to which the decision-maker actually had access that he was either misinformed or less well-
informed than we had imagined. A more stringent application of the doctrine of respect for
informed choice would lead us to make that determination based on the facts (or apparent
facts) to which the decision maker eﬀectively had access. The resulting reﬁnement agenda
deﬁnes a potential role for neuroeconomics.
The logic of the reﬁnement agenda Suppose a planner (P) must choose between two
actions, A and B, the consequences of which aﬀect only one individual (I) and depend upon
a parameter θ,w h i c hP always observes (call the true value θ
T). P looks to I’s choices
for guidance. Upon learning that I has sometimes chosen A and sometimes B when the
value of the parameter has been θ
T (which P assumes I can also observe), P fears that those
choices have ambiguous implications. In an eﬀort to understand I’s apparently conﬂicting
choices, P examines them more closely, and makes one of the following two discoveries.
First, suppose P learns that, in some instances, contrary to his assumption, I did not
actually have the opportunity to observe θ. Moreover, whenever I did have that opportunity,
I chose A. In that case, according to standard choice-based welfare principles, P should
choose A,n o tB. P must either reinterpret the choice situations in which I selected B in
light of I’s less-than-perfect information concerning θ, or disqualify those choice situations51
for the purpose of welfare analysis if he cannot determine the extent of I’s knowledge. But
now observe that precisely the same conclusions would follow if P discovered that, whenever
I chose B, I simply neglected to observe θ
T despite having the opportunity to do so. It
makes no diﬀerence whether I lacked the opportunity to observe θ, neglected to observe it
due to inattention, or observed and then forgot it whenever he chose B;i ne a c hc a s e ,I’s
decision was eﬀectively not informed by the observation that θ = θ
T, and hence should not
guide a planner who observes θ
T.
Next, suppose P learns that, whenever I chose B, I was provided with incorrect infor-
mation concerning θ (speciﬁcally, that θ = θ
F 6= θ
T). In that case, according to standard
choice-based welfare principles, P should again choose A,n o tB. P must either reinterpret
the choice situations in which I selected B in light of I’s misinformation, or disqualify those
choice situations for the purpose of welfare analysis if he cannot nail down the misinformation
(speciﬁcally, the value of θ
F). But now observe that precisely the same conclusions would
follow if P discovered that, whenever I chose B, I misinterpreted the available factual data
as implying that θ = θ
F rather than θ = θ
T. It makes no diﬀerence whether I was provided
with incorrect data or misinterpreted correct data whenever he chose B;i ne i t h e rc a s e ,I’s
decision was not correctly informed by the observation that θ = θ
T, and hence should not
guide a planner who observes θ
T.
The preceding discussion implies that evidence concerning the manner in which people
observe and process factual information can in principle shed light on the extent to which
speciﬁc choices are eﬀectively informed, and hence appropriate as guides for normative analy-
sis. Despite having access to particular information, a decision maker may be insuﬃciently
attentive, fail to recall important facts that relate choices to consequences, forecast the con-
sequences of his choices incorrectly, or learn from his past experiences more slowly that the
available information would permit. Therefore, by studying the neurobiology of attention,
memory, forecasting, and learning, it may be possible to identify speciﬁc conditions under
which people are either eﬀectively misinformed, or eﬀectively less well-informed than they52
would be if they correctly processed all the available factual information.
The following simple example motivates the use of evidence from neuroscience. An indi-
vidual is oﬀered a choice between alternatives A and B.H e c h o o s e s A when the alternatives
are described verbally, and B when they are described partly verbally and partly in writing.
Which choice is the best guide for public policy? If we learn that the information was
provided in a dark room, we would be inclined to respect the choice of A, rather than the
choice of B. We would reach the same conclusion if an opthamologist certiﬁed that the indi-
vidual was blind, or, more interestingly, if a brain scan revealed that the individual’s visual
processing circuitry was impaired. In all of these cases, non-choice evidence sheds light on
the likelihood that the individual successfully processed information that was in principle
available to him, thereby properly identiﬁed his alternatives and their consequences.
An application: addiction My work on addiction with Antonio Rangel (Bernheim and
Rangel, 2004) provides a practical application of the agenda described in the previous sec-
tion. Citing evidence from neuroscience, we argue as follows. First, the brain’s forecasting
circuitry includes a speciﬁc neural system that measures empirical correlations between cues
and potential rewards. The system learns by adjusting the estimated correlations in response
to surprises.28 Second, unlike other consumption goods, addictive substances directly stim-
ulate the neurobiological activity that codes for surprises. Consequently, the repeated use
of an addictive substance causes that system to measure empirical correlations incorrectly,
and hence to forecast exaggerated rewards in the presence of cues that are associated with
its use.29 Whether or not that system also plays a role in hedonic experience, the choices
28Recent research indicates that the mesolimbic dopamine system (MDS) functions, at least in part,
as a mechanism for forecasting hedonic responses, based on environmental cues (see Schultz, Dayan, and
Montague, 1997, and Schultz, 1998, 2000). The evidence points toward a temporal diﬀerence reinforcement
learning (TDRL) model of the MDS. The subject’s dopamine response at the presentation of the cue codes
for an expectation (or forecast), while the response at the presentation of the reward codes for a surprise
(the discrepancy between expectations and observation). Learning converges when there is no longer any
surprise.
29There is a large and growing consensus in neuroscience that addictive substances share an ability to
activate the ﬁring of dopamine with much greater intensity and persistence than other substances (see
Nestler and Malenka, 2004, Hyman and Malenka, 2001, Nestler, 2001, Wickelgreen, 1997, and Robinson53
made in the presence of those cues are therefore predicated on improperly processed factual
information. Therefore, welfare evaluations should be guided by choices made under other
conditions.
As an illustration, suppose a recovering alcoholic drinks whenever he socializes with
drinkers, but at other times would happily impose upon himself a binding commitment not
to drink in such situations. Because those choices pertain to precisely the same actions
and circumstances, there is plainly a conﬂict. We resolve that conﬂict in favor of the
precommitment, on the grounds that a decision to drink taken in the presence of a cue
(social interaction with drinkers) associated with the consumption of an addictive substance
(alcohol) is inﬂuenced by a neural forecast that is most likely distorted due to the substance’s
neurobiological properties. The cue, and even the ﬂawed forecast itself, may also have
hedonic consequences, but the individual presumably considers those consequences when
deciding whether to make a precommitment that would restrict his behavior contingent on
exposure to the cue.
Thus, the analysis in Bernheim and Rangel [2004] serves as proof of concept for the
reﬁnement agenda proposed in Bernheim and Rangel [2007, 2008, 2009]. More generally, it
suggests that research on neural processes can play an important role in the analysis of a
standard normative economic question.
2.2.2 Normative analysis when choice data are unavailable
Now I turn to the second issue: how can we reliably evaluate welfare, using choice as a
foundation, when no actual choices are available? In ongoing work, Colin Camerer, Anto-
nio Rangel, and I are exploring one possible solution to this problem, involving the use of
neuroeconomic methods. At this stage, our work is still preliminary, so I will conﬁne my
remarks to a brief description of our agenda.
and Berridge, 2003). As a result, the dopamine response occurring with the presentation of a reward
(consumption of the substance) always registers a surprise (Di Chiara, 1999), even with experience, which
implies that temporal diﬀerence reinforcement learning cannot converge (Redish, 2004). Consequently, when
an addict encounters a drug-related cue, the MDS pleasure forecast is necessarily exaggerated.54
As discussed in Section 1.4.2, neuroeconomic methods may enable us to predict accurately
the choices that people would make from any given set of prospects by measuring their neural
responses to those prospects, even when no choice is oﬀered — indeed, even if no choice is
possible. One could then supplement actual choice data with these synthetic choices for
the purpose of conducting normative analysis. For example, one might accurately forecast
the choice that an individual would make between an environmental outcome (such as the
avoidance of the environmental damage resulting from an oil spill) and various monetary
payoﬀs, thereby associating that outcome with an economic value. The standard choice-
theoretic welfare framework would be retained; one would simply use synthetic choices rather
than actual choices when the latter are unavailable.30
3C o n c l u s i o n s
In my opinion, the potential for the emerging ﬁeld of neuroeconomics to shed light on tra-
ditional economic questions has been overstated by some, unappreciated by others, and
misunderstood by many. With respect to positive economic analyses of decision making,
the case for studying the neural foundations of decision-making is hardly self-evident. Cer-
tain claims, such as the suggestion that it is possible to formulate neural tests of conventional
behavioral hypotheses, appear at this point to be overstated. Nevertheless, neuroeconomics
could in principle contribute to conventional positive economics in a number of ways which I
have attempted to catalog in the ﬁrst portion of this paper. Based on that catalog, I ques-
tion whether the impact of neuroeconomics on the analysis of conventional positive economic
issues is likely to be revolutionary.
I see somewhat greater potential in the area of normative economics. I do not believe
that neuroeconomics will provide us with the technology to measure utility directly, and
30In principle, neural measurements could play the same predictive role in happiness-based welfare analysis.
However, the value of such predictions would be modest at best. Why use brain scans to construct noisy
predictions of a subject’s answers to questions about happiness and/or satisfaction when we can simply pose
those questions directly?55
thereby ultimately replace choice-based welfare analysis with a new utilitarian paradigm.
However, I have argued that it holds the potential to improve choice-based welfare analysis
in two ways. First, by shedding light on the manner in which the brain processes factual
information, it can provide objective criteria for disqualifying certain choices for the purpose
of welfare analysis. Second, it may allow us to predict the choices that people would make
from any given set of prospects based on their passive neural responses. Such predictions
would permit us to conduct choice-based welfare analysis even when no choice is actually
possible.
Many neuroeconomists have been surprised and frustrated to learn that skepticism con-
cerning their ﬁeld’s potential among mainstream economists runs deep. How can they
combat that skepticism? First, they must do a better job of articulating speciﬁc visions
of the ﬁeld’s potential contributions to mainstream economics. Such an articulation would
ideally identify a standard economic question of broad interest (e.g., how taxes aﬀect saving),
and outline a conceivable research agenda that could lead to speciﬁc, useful insights of direct
relevance to that question. Most economists are not convinced by vague assertions that
a deeper understanding of decision-making processes will lead to better models of choice.
Second, it is essential to avoid hyperbole. Exaggerated claims fuel skepticism. Third, the
ultimate proof is in the pudding. To convert the skeptics, neuroeconomists need to accumu-
late the right type of success stories — ones that illuminate conventional economic questions
that attracted wide interest among economists prior to the advent of neuroeconomic research.56
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